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ABSTRACT

The context for financial aid policy affecting black doctoral students in Oklahoma and Florida was studied using the case study method. Attention was focused on environmental and organizational variables affecting the implementation of financial aid policy. Historical patterns surrounding race relations in both states before the 1973 "Adams" decision were reviewed. The decision established criteria for desegregating state systems of public higher education. The analysis considered political factors (e.g., electoral trends); demographic factors (e.g., population composition and concentration), economic factors (e.g., median income, unemployment rate); and educational resources (e.g., size and diversity of students, administrators, faculty, and board members and the presence/absence of campus-based affirmative action programs. The methodology consisted of unstructured interviews and examination of the states' approved "Adams" plan, annual reports, and other publications. Using the policy system model, attention was directed to policy-relevant environment factors, policy statements, policy actions, and policy outcome variables. Data are provided on: graduate student enrollments, 1977-1983; doctoral degrees conferred; and political, economic, and demographic trends. The interview schedule is included. (SW)

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Southern Education Foundation
Atlanta, Georgia 30308

Financial Assistance to Black Doctoral Students In Two Adams States: A Policy Analysis

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A Report of Research Completed
Under a Grant from the
Southern Education Foundation

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FOREWORD

The Southern Education Foundation and the family philanthropies which preceded it have had a special and continuing interest in the education of black Americans for more than a hundred years. The Foundation has been concerned particularly with programs aimed at increasing and improving higher education opportunities for blacks in the South.

In April, 1974, the SEF Board of Directors (renamed Board of Trustees in 1984) established a special project, the Higher Education Program, to address issues which were surfacing as a result of the then Adams v. Richardson case. Under this higher education component, the Foundation supported coalitions formed by citizens to monitor state desegregation plans, sponsored conferences and workshops, published papers, monographs and documents, and awarded general grants which focused specifically on achieving equity in higher education in the ten states originally affected by the Adams case.

In September, 1978, the Higher Education Program proposed concentrating a major portion of its allocation on a Research Task Force which was formed to plan a research agenda for the Foundation and to commission research projects. This body of six educators has commissioned over 20 studies since its inception; this document is presented as part of the Higher Education Program Research Series. Other publications which are part of the series are listed at the end of this report and are available to the public for $5.00 each.

SEF has been able to expand its Higher Education Program as a result of receiving grants since July, 1983 from the Ford Foundation; the publication of this report is made possible by the grants.

A list of other Foundation publications may be obtained by writing to the Southern Education Foundation.

Thank you.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Chapter One: Introduction	1
Background	3
Organization of This Report	9
Chapter Two: History of Race Relations	10
Oklahoma	10
Desegregation Litigation	14
Florida	19
Desegregation Litigation	22
Chapter Three: Research Design	28
Environmental Factors: A Contextual Analysis	28
Political Factors	30
Electoral Trends--Florida	30
Electoral Trends--Oklahoma	32
Demographic Factors	34
Economic Factors	37
Educational Factors	39
The Case Study Method	41
Selection of Case Study States	43
Unstructured Interviews	44
Document Analysis	49
Policy System Model	52
Chapter Four: Results	57
Policy Statements	57
Policy Actions	69
Policy Initiatives	78
Policy Outcomes	84

Page

Chapter Five: Summary and Conclusions 87

Summary 87
Conclusions 87
Implications for Future Research. 94

Figures

Figure 1: Research Model 51
Figure 2: Possible Relationships Among Policy-Related Variable Clusters. 56

Appendix I: Tables. 99

Table 1: U.S. Graduate Student Enrollment by Race-Ethnicity 1978 and 1982. 100

Table 2: Florida Graduate Student Enrollment, 1977-1984 . . 101

Table 3: Oklahoma Graduate Student Enrollment, 1977-1982 . . 102

Table 4: Total Doctoral Degrees Conferred (U.S.) 103

Table 5: Florida Doctoral Degrees Conferred, 1977-1983. . . 104

Table 6: Oklahoma Doctoral Degrees Conferred, 1977-1983 . . 105

Table 7: Black Elected Officials by Office. 106

Table 8: State Voter Registration, 1982 107

Table 9: National Voter Registration, 1982. 108

Table 10: Oklahoma Black Elected Officials and Their Committee Assignments. 109

Table 11: Florida's Black Legislators and Their Committee Assignments. 110

Table 12: National College-Age Cohort and Total Population, 1980 112

Table 13: Percent and Total Population of Florida by Race, 1980 113

Table 14: College-Age (18-24 Years) by Race, Florida and Oklahoma, 1980 114

Page

Table 15: Percent and Total Population of Oklahoma by Race, 1980 115

Table 16: National Median Family Income, 1980. 116

Table 17: Persons Below the Poverty Level, 1981. 117

Table 18: Oklahoma and Florida Median Family Incomes in 1979 by Race. 118

Table 19: The Education Pipeline for Black and White Students in the U.S., 1980. 119

Table 20: Black Faculty in Oklahoma's Traditionally White Institutions, 1982-1983. 120

Table 21: Black Faculty in Florida's Traditionally White Institutions, 1982-1983. 121

Table 22: Black Administrators in the Oklahoma State University System, 1982-1983 122

Table 23: Black Administrators in the Florida State University System, 1982-1983 123

Table 24: Participants' Level of Knowledge of, and Type of Response to, State Plan, by Level of Responsibility 124

Appendix II: Interview Schedule Document. 125

References 131

Authors. 137

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Financial aid is a major ingredient in increasing the number of black doctoral degree recipients. Lack of financial support prevents many blacks from entering graduate school, it causes some to postpone entry, and it causes many who do enter to drop out. The increase in doctoral degree recipients in the early 1970s was simultaneous with increases in federal and state support. And the current decline parallels the decline in these same sources of support (National Commission on Student Financial Assistance, 1983).

Doctoral students are independent. Parents are expected to assist their children through college and, for the most part, to put them on their own thereafter. The major sources of graduate support, then, are funds from the public and private sector, and from the student's own resources. They take the form of fellowships, loans, teaching and research assistantships, and personal savings.

One source of government support is the states. It is not new for states to provide financial aid for graduate students. In our public universities, a large proportion of the undergraduate teaching is done by graduate students as is a considerable amount of the bench work on research projects. Moreover, graduate schools offer fellowships to attract the ablest students, and with a package of aids, retain those who do well. Such aid is designed to cover tuition and fees, and to provide stipends to assist with other expenses.

The framers of the Adams guidelines recognized the centrality of financial aid and included it as a necessary ingredient in increasing black access to the highest levels of education. The relevant sections of the guidelines read as follows:

> An acceptable plan shall commit the state to the goal of assuring that the system as a whole and each institution within the system provide an equal educational opportunity, are open and accessible to all students, and operate without regard to race and on a desegregated basis . . . .
>
> To achieve the desegregation of student enrollment, each plan shall: . . . commit the state and all its involved agencies and subdivisions to specific measures to achieve these goals.
>
> Such measures may include . . . financial aid . . . . (Federal Register, Vol. 43, No. 32 - P. 6662, Wednesday, February 15, 1978.)

This statement is included in the criteria against which the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) was ordered in 1978, in the case of Adams v. Califano, to judge state plans to desegregate state systems of public higher education. The purpose of our research was to examine the context in which implementation of financial aid policy affecting black doctoral students takes place in Oklahoma and Florida. Our object was to use the case study method to identify environmental and organizational variables surrounding implementation of financial aid policy and to generate hypotheses regarding the administration process and how it relates to public policy.

Background

The Adams criteria for desegregating state systems of public higher education arose out of the Adams v. Califano lawsuit, initiated in 1970 by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF), which required HEW to take action to enforce the provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The criteria, also known as "guidelines," are used by the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) in reviewing the progress of the states.

In 1973, a U.S. District Court ordered HEW to require 10 states to draw up compliance plans for desegregating their dual systems of higher education. The decision gave the 10 states the option of compliance with the Court order or termination of their federal funds. These states, which became known as Adams states, included the two states that are the focus of this report, Oklahoma and Florida.

In 1978-79, black graduate student enrollment, as a percentage of total graduate student enrollment, was 5.7 percent on the national level, as compared with 7.1 percent in Florida and 3.3 percent in Oklahoma. In 1982-83, graduate enrollments in both Florida and Oklahoma dropped below their 1978-79 percentages. Florida dropped 2.3 percent for blacks and 1.4 percent for whites. Graduate enrollment in Oklahoma decreased 0.2 percent for blacks and 2.7 percent for whites (see Tables 1, 2, and 3).

In doctoral degrees conferred, Florida was only 0.1 percent below the national mean for blacks (3.8 percent) in 1978-79, while Oklahoma was 1.7 percentage points above the national mean for blacks. In 1982-83, both Florida (1.3 percent above) and Oklahoma (0.2 percent above) were slightly above the national mean (3.2 percent) for black

doctoral degrees conferred (see Tables 4, 5, and 6). However, in both states and at the national level, a significant underrepresentation of blacks receiving doctoral degrees occurs.

Financial aid is extremely important to black graduate students, especially in the face of declining federal and private financial support. Financial aid facilitates entry into and persistence in graduate school. A variety of factors, including rising tuition costs and reduced student financial aid, may combine to produce a further decline in degree completion by blacks in the years to come. These facts justify an exploratory study of the conditions under which financial aid policy is made.

Before analyzing the reactions of Florida and Oklahoma to the financial aid guidelines, it is important to understand the role of student financial aid in graduate education with special reference to black students. Most graduate students have one thing in common. Most must support themselves through their period of study: paying tuition and fees, buying clothes, books, and food, and furnishing transportation. In 1983, the National Commission on Student Financial Assistance noted that financial aid to graduate students should be one of the nation's highest priorities. Observing that the costs of pursuing graduate education continue to rise, it pointed out that without adequate student financial aid, graduate schools will be unable to attract and train the talent the nation needs. Further, the report noted the grave underrepresentation of blacks in doctoral programs and observed that financial need is one of the foremost barriers to their access and graduation.

Syverson (1983) reports that in 1982, 31,048 research doctoral degrees were conferred by American universities. Only 1,037 or 3 percent went to blacks. Whites, other U.S. minorities, and foreign nationals, earned the remainder. At the time of graduation blacks' median age was 37.5, compared to whites at 32.3. Blacks had taken a median of 13 years past college graduation to complete the Ph.D. degree compared to 9.6 years for whites. Whites supported their graduate school study much more heavily from teaching-and research-assistantships than did blacks. Whites were three times more likely than blacks to be planning for postdoctoral study. By contrast, blacks planned to go directly to work.

These data paint a graphic picture of underrepresentation of blacks among doctoral recipients. And, the number has been declining since the mid 1970s. The sparsity of available research-and teaching-assistantships reflects blacks' disproportionate use of loans (Flamer, et al., 1982). Planning to go to work immediately upon graduation reflects a need to repay loans and possibly to rapidly end a period of extended financial need.

The National Commission on Student Financial Assistance (1983) reported that the sources of support most lacking among black doctoral students are university-based support through teaching-assistantships, research-assistantships, and fellowships. Typically, funds for this kind of support at public universities come from state appropriations, and it is the source of funds that would be made available in the Adams states.

The number of Americans living below the poverty level has been increasing rapidly with minorities bearing a disproportionate share of the burden. It is not unusual for the majority of the black students in an historically black college to come from families with an annual income of less than $10,000. Indeed families with less than $10,000 annual income account for nearly two-thirds of talented and needy graduate students (Flamer, et al., 1982). After college graduation, children from these families are more inclined to accept a job than to enroll in graduate school. Our major contention is that financial aid increasingly is becoming a problem for all graduate students, but that the economic barriers that black students face are far more formidable than those white students face.

In order to develop a perspective on this matter, two topics should be addressed: the role of the states in financial aid, and the history of blacks in graduate education. Historically, the states have been responsible for higher education in this country. As early as 1776 support of colleges was assumed by the fledging states. At the present time the largest proportion of support for colleges and universities--43 percent--comes from the states. The remainder is divided among the federal government, which provides 25 percent, and private sources, which provide 32 percent (Fenske, 1983). This is, indeed, student financial aid in its most fundamental sense.

In addition to the basic support they provide by funding higher education institutions, states have been providing special student financial aid programs for some time. These programs have been designed to assist various groups that meet a variety of state interests and

purposes. For example, in 1909, Connecticut began a program to recruit trained manpower, and in 1913, New York started its Regents Scholarship Program. Later, Pennsylvania started a program to give awards to students in each political district. The list goes on to include every special state program in the nation, up to and including Florida in 1970, and Oklahoma in 1971, and the Northern Marianas that started a program in 1978 (Fenske, 1983).

Historians often overlook the special case of black people. In the 1940s (and possibly in the late 1930s), out-of-state scholarships were made available by Southern states to Negroes who wished to pursue graduate study in disciplines provided only for whites in their states (Weinberg, 1977). The states arranged to assist Negroes in this way in order to avoid appropriating money for separate but equal graduate schools.

The role of the states in financial aid cannot be divorced from the history of blacks in graduate education and research. The efforts of blacks to pursue graduate study have been more protracted than efforts to provide access to undergraduate study. Weinberg (1977) provides an enlightening analysis of this situation. He reports that through their failure to adequately fund public black colleges, state legislatures prevented the development of black graduate students. As late as 1930, not a single black person was enrolled in graduate study in the South. This stands in stark contrast to the total of 11,000 whites so enrolled. Blacks who wanted to attend graduate school were forced to go North.

Related to the absence of graduate course work was the absence of research facilities. Weinberg (1977) reports that although federal research funds could have been made available to black land-grant

institutions, state legislatures chose to channel all of these funds to their white counterparts.

Moreover, according to Weinberg (1977), legislatures believed that the provision of post-baccalaureate training was a private responsibility. Hence, private foundations, such as the Rosenwald Fund, funded fellowships for blacks to engage in graduate study. It was only after the U.S. Supreme Court argued in favor of separate but equal graduate facilities that the states began to provide the out-of-state scholarships referred to above. (This point will be explicated further in the next chapter's discussion of Gaines v. Canada, et al.)

Given this understanding of black graduate student financial aid and the role of the states, we designed this project as a comparative case study. Research and writing on financial aid to black graduate students has been primarily quantitative in nature (Blackwell, 1981; Flamer, Horch, & Davis, 1982; Lehner, 1980; National Commission on Student Financial Assistance, 1983; Pruitt, 1983; Pruitt, 1984; Syverson, 1983). It has focused on the number of students and the amount and type of aid received. Also, it has documented declining enrollment and the serious implications of decreasing financial support. A case study enables researchers to probe the subject matter, history and development and to examine the interaction among factors that contribute to a phenomenon.

Although the manifest goals of our analysis are financial aid initiatives, the complex and ever-changing guidelines for implementing the Adams mandate necessitated our analyzing the possible removal of

financial barriers within the broader context of each state's organizational characteristics and structure. Therefore, analyses of the states' specific features are the study's latent goals.

Social science data on the effects of organizational arrangements and of the perceptions of policymakers on the implementation of policies that address financial barriers to graduate education are scarce. Our study intends to begin filling these gaps by analyzing the policy process surrounding the implementation of the Adams criteria. We could not study financial aid initiatives in isolation from a state's organization structure and characteristics.

Organization of This Report

This chapter will be followed by a brief history of race relations in Oklahoma and Florida. Chapter Three will present the research design, Chapter Four, the results, and Chapter Five the summary and conclusions.

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORY OF RACE RELATIONS

Oklahoma

In order to understand the formulation and implementation of Adams criteria in Oklahoma, one must discern the historical patterns that have surrounded race relations in the state. This section reviews the events that predate the 1973 Adams decision.

Oklahoma, like other southern and border states, operated a system of de jure segregation until the 1954 Brown decision. Ironically, this white embrace of Jim Crowism was conspicuously absent in Oklahoma's early history. Legal segregation was an afterthought in Oklahoma.

The first government of the Oklahoma Territory began in 1890. Although race relations were hardly amicable, segregation was not legally sanctioned. The first Territorial Assembly in 1890 gave counties the option of having segregated or integrated schools. The legislation called for individual counties to place a referendum on the ballot, and, determine by popular vote the maintenance of segregated or integrated schools (Cross, 1975, P. 26; Franklin, 1980, P. 13). The county option policy meant that Oklahoma, relative to states like Louisiana and Mississippi, for example, was liberal on the question of integrated education.

Unfortunately, Oklahoma's county option plan was abolished in 1897 when Oklahoma "passed a stronger law that required the total segregation of black and white children" (Franklin, 1980, P. 13).

This compulsory inferiority law came on the heels of the Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) case. Homer Adolp Plessy, who was 1/8 black, was arrested for refusing to be seated in a segregated (black) section of a railroad car. He vigorously challenged the constitutionality of that Jim Crow law, which, unfortunately for him and for black Americans as a whole, the Supreme Court upheld. From 1890 to 1906, Oklahoma quickly embraced the Supreme Court's legitimization of Jim Crow laws (Franklin, 1980, P. 14).

In 1906, Congress passed the Enabling Act (Hamilton Bill), which paved the way for Oklahoma to gain statehood. Although the Act forbade racial discrimination in theory, it did sanction, in practice, the rights of persons to create and maintain segregated schools. The Enabling Act clearly gave white Oklahomans the choice between segregated and integrated education policies (Cross, 1975, P. 28; Franklin, 1980, Pp. 14-16).

When the elected delegates convened to write the Oklahoma constitution, they opted for segregated schools. Article XIII of the constitution stated that "separate schools for white and colored with like accommodations shall be provided by the legislature and impartially maintained" (Cross, 1975, P. 29). Later events strongly suggest that black schools never received "like accommodations." Since the state legislature had not specifically mentioned segregation in higher education, this issue was not addressed until 1908. Legislation was

enacted stating that "it shall be unlawful for any person, corporation or association of persons, to maintain or operate any college, school or institution of this state where persons of both the white and colored races are received as pupils for instruction (Cross, 1975, P. 29). This racially dual education system would last at least another four decades.

The daily lives of Oklahoma blacks during the Jim Crow era were characterized by everything from inconvenience to violent assaults. The case of Walter White, an NAACP worker who was light enough to pass for white, is illustrative. White was able to infiltrate the Oklahoma Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s. The Klansmen considered him a zealous white supremist, and he was sworn into a Klan-dominated police force as a sheriff's deputy. He was told, "Now you can go out and kill any negro you see and the law'll be behind you" (Katz, 1967, P. 350). Furthermore, Oklahoma blacks were the victims of harsh terrorist actions by white mobs. Whites, not fearing negative sanctions from the legal system, burned, lynched, raped, and whipped blacks. For example, in 1923, 2,500 blacks were flogged by whites in Oklahoma (Katz, 1967, P. 397).

In addition to blatant and violent forms of discrimination, Oklahoma blacks also faced daily reminders of their subordinate status. Oklahoma outlawed integrated phone booths, restrooms, restaurants, and other public facilities. By adopting this stance, Oklahoma joined the debasement practiced in states like Alabama, which even made it a criminal offense for blacks and whites to play checkers and dominoes together (Katz, 1967, P. 341). Oklahoma had begun as a relatively liberal state, but that position changed soon after 1896.

Another indicator of the state's strained race relations was the formation of all-black towns. In fact, Edward McCabe, a strong-willed black New Englander, actually came to Oklahoma with the dangerous idea of converting it into a black state. He planned to convince large numbers of blacks from Texas and other surrounding states to move to Oklahoma. Because Oklahoma was a young state with few residents, he assumed that blacks could win the major political offices and eventually dominate the state's politics and economics. History, however, shows that McCabe underestimated his opponents. He was informed by a white group that blacks would die violently if he tried to implement his plan. McCabe, faced with the prospect of race riots, capitulated and concentrated his energies on establishing an all-black town, Langston. Langston and other small towns, such as Boley, which were created around 1903, contributed to Oklahoma's segregated populace (Franklin, 1980, P. 6-8).

The racial folkways, mores, and laws that defined blacks as inferior human beings were not conducive to establishing integrated schools. For example, Langston University, the state's only public traditionally black college, was established because whites did not want blacks to attend the state's "white" schools (Oklahoma State Regents, Extended Revised State Plan--Supplement Three, 1983, Pp. 10-11). Such practices were common throughout the South.

On the other hand, it could be argued that, during the 1920s, segregated schools were not the worst troubles black Oklahomans faced. For example, in 1916, the Oklahoma legislature passed the Registration Law, a derivative of the grandfather clause, which effectively kept

blacks from voting. Indeed, most Oklahoma blacks would not receive the right to vote until 1939. Not only were blacks denied political participation, they were restricted to farming or menial city jobs. Few blacks accumulated enough capital to live above the poverty line, and many lived destitute.

To compound this problem, blacks also lived in constant fear of white mobs and the Ku Klux Klan, as illustrated by a 1921 race riot. In this riot, which resulted from an erroneous story in the Tulsa Tribune claiming that a black man had tried to rape an orphaned white girl, at least 36 people, mostly black, were killed (Franklin, 1980, Pp. 31-35). White mobs destroyed black homes, churches, and businesses and killed many blacks in the process. These actions by whites were, in many ways, the logical extension of Jim Crow-type laws.

Desegregation Litigation

When black political and economic clout began to improve in the 1930s, both nationally and in individual states, blacks demanded an end to segregated public facilities. This push for equality was most evident in Oklahoma.

Between 1935 and 1954, the Legal Defense Fund (LDF) of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) initiated an aggressive nationwide desegregation campaign. The LDF argued five major cases before the Supreme Court: 1) University of Maryland v. Murray (1935), 2) Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada (1938), 3) Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma (1948), 4) Sweatt v. Painter (1950), and 5) McLauren v. Oklahoma Regents (1950). Considering Oklahoma's historical penchant for discriminating against blacks, it is

not surprising that two of the most important desegregation cases originated in that state. Our analysis will focus on the cases involving Sipuel and McLauren.

In 1946, a young black woman named Ada Lois Sipuel applied for entrance to the all-white University of Oklahoma Law School after graduating with honors from Langston University. Because Langston had no law school, she applied to the University of Oklahoma (Dimond, 1982, P. 114). Sipuel's application drew attention to several issues: 1) the historical underfinancing of Langston University; 2) the myth of equal and separate public facilities; and 3) the legitimacy of discrimination based solely on race.

At the outset of the Sipuel case, there was little doubt, contrary to the reports of white state officials, that Langston did not compare favorably with the state's TWIs. The major cause of Langston's problems was a deliberate plan of underfinancing by state officials that meant that Langston was unable to offer advanced degrees, contemporary physical facilities, and/or a broad curriculum. According to Franklin (1980, P. 49), "many white Oklahomans did not relish the idea of pouring large amounts of money into an institution to train blacks for fields where they would compete with whites. Others simply did not believe in preparing blacks for anything except teacher education and agriculture." Langston had dedicated teachers and students hungry for knowledge, but the lack of funds made operating the school an arduous task. The Sipuel case brought Langston's plight under national scrutiny.

Another issue raised by Sipuel was the myth of equality in separate public facilities. Blacks in Oklahoma and other southern states never enjoyed comparable public facilities. Langston University and other all-black public facilities lacked funds. Oklahoma's history is replete with examples of separate and unequal treatment of blacks. Discriminatory educational policies have received the bulk of the scholarly attention because of the major desegregation victories and their implications for other arenas. Suffice it to say that, at the time of Sipuel, Oklahoma's blacks were ill-housed, poorly educated, underemployed, disillusioned, and on the brink of revolt in response to de facto and de jure segregation.

Out-of-state tuition grants were a common white ploy to keep in-state blacks from integrating state colleges (Jones, 1955, Pp. 108-109). Consistent with segregation's nature, these grants rarely covered any significant percentage of the costs incurred by black students. For example, the Oklahoma legislature never appropriated more than $50,000 a year, and grants usually averaged only $140 a student (Franklin, 1980, P. 49). Since black students had to travel far to attend graduate and professional schools, the out-of-state grant was not a realistic option. To most blacks, it meant the end of graduate school.

In response to a Supreme Court ruling that Sipuel had the right to an equal education within the state, white state officials established a make-shift school of law for Langston University. Sipuel, though, refused to attend this "professional school" because it had no scholarly reputation, contemporary facilities, or high-quality faculty. Indeed,

the school of law consisted of three rooms in the state capitol building, a dean, and two professors (Dimond, 1982, P. 114). Three years later, after numerous court battles, Sipuel was finally admitted to the University of Oklahoma.

The next landmark Oklahoma desegregation case involved G. W. McLauren, a Langston University faculty member. In the summer of 1948, a federal district court ordered McLauren admitted to the University of Oklahoma. State officials consented to the mandate on a segregated basis and assigned McLauren a chair outside the lecture hall and a "special" seat in the library and the cafeteria. Both the formal and informal norms that proscribed behavior at the University alienated him and his peers from each other (Woodward, 1974, P. 144).

The Supreme Court further ruled that admitting McLauren was not sufficient in itself, that the University was also responsible for assuring him an equal, nondiscriminatory education. According to the Court, segregating McLauren from his classmates would "impair and inhibit his ability to study, engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and in general, to learn his profession" (Woodward, 1974, P. 144). The Supreme Court's ruling was a crucial blow against segregation in Oklahoma and in the nation as a whole.

The Sipuel and McLauren cases acted as preludes to the Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas (1954) ruling, which declared segregated education inherently unequal. Oklahoma's white residents initially rejected the idea of integration, but such rejection was typical in southern and border states.

In the late 1950s, black Oklahomans began to employ the nonviolent methods of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. For at least a decade, groups of blacks, many of them pre-teenagers, used the sit-in tactic to gain entry

to restaurants, department stores, amusement parks, and hotels. Whites had been well socialized under Jim Crowism, and they resisted these integration attempts. In fact, not until the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did many white Oklahomans retreat from their demands for forced segregation. However, the vestiges of past racism still linger.

In 1969, HEW investigated Oklahoma and nine other southern or border states to determine if they were maintaining dual systems of higher education. Not unexpectedly, HEW found in each state public universities that reflected the Jim Crow era. That is, the states were funding segregated higher education in the form of "black" and "white" colleges and universities.

HEW sent letters to each state requesting voluntary desegregation. In the next year, no state submitted an acceptable desegregation plan (Haynes, 1978, II-4). The LDF, continuing its long involvement in the desegregation of higher education, filed a class action "omnibus" suit against HEW. This suit, which has since been referred to as Adams v. Richardson, was designed to force HEW to obtain desegregation plans from the ten states.

The case stayed in the court(s) for the next three years until U.S. District Court Judge John H. Pratt threatened to withdraw federal funds from any state that did not develop and implement a desegregation plan. During the next five years, the states filibustered. In 1977, Judge Pratt restated his view that dual systems of higher education violated the 1964 civil rights law and, therefore, that defaulting states were gambling with their allotment of federal funds.

In January, 1978, Oklahoma became one of the first states to submit an "acceptable" plan to HEW. The most important component of this plan was entitled Compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act: Revised State Plan Supplement Two. Another document, submitted in September, 1978, addressed the specific status of the state's black university; it was called Statement of Mission for Langston University. These two documents constituted Oklahoma's good-faith efforts to remove the final vestiges of racial dualism from its public higher education system.

In order to gauge the efforts of Oklahoma officials to eliminate racial dualism in the state's educational institutions, we must compare their progress with the broad objectives of the Adams guidelines, whose major points are summarized as follows (Prestage, 1982, P. 74)):

1. the desegregation of student enrollment;
2. the desegregation of faculty, administration, staff, and governance;
3. the enhancement of historically black institutions; and
4. the disestablishment of the structure of the dual system.

Florida

The current status of the Adams case in Florida is also best understood within the historical context of that state's race relations. This section traces relations between blacks and whites over the last century. Florida, like Oklahoma and other southern states, enacted segregation laws. For example, the 1885 constitutional convention in Tallahassee approved Article Nine, which stated that

"white children and colored children shall not be taught in the same school, but equal provisions shall be made for both" (White, 1975, P. 2).

Not surprisingly, "black" schools did not receive equal provisions, discrimination that grew out of the pervasive views of whites towards blacks. Whether by state edict, local law, or the more pervasive coercion of white opinion, the black American's place was defined everywhere--in the schools, courts, parks, restaurants, trains, hospitals, residential districts, sidewalks and cemeteries (Woodward, 1971, P. 212). Florida's segregated schools served to reinforce the state's caste structure.

Implementing Article Nine resulted in creating two normal schools for teachers in 1887, one white, the other black. The black school eventually became Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University (FAMU). Interestingly, the racially-dual educational system established almost a century ago remains, after only slight changes, intact today.

A decade after Florida established separate schools, the U. S. government sanctioned segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896). Justice Brown's opinion (in White, 1975, P. 3) was consistent with the views of white Floridians.

> Laws permitting and requiring separation of the races . . . do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other and have been generally recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures in . . . their police powers. The most common instance of this is connected with the establishment of separate schools for white and colored children, which has been held as a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of states where the political rights of the colored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced.

Additional segregation laws were passed in 1913. The most strident of these statutes forbade white teachers to teach blacks in black schools. Conversely, it was unlawful for blacks to teach in white schools. Anyone violating these laws could be fined $500 and jailed for six months (White, 1975, P. 3).

Florida's handling of the race issue was straightforward: blacks and whites were to be educated, housed, entertained, fed, and governed in separate worlds--conditions that inevitably resulted in blacks being relegated to second-class citizenship. Mays, a long-time educator and civil rights leader, summed up the situation in the following manner.

> Negroes, with low incomes, poor academic backgrounds before college, unfortunate home conditions, and ancestors handicapped for three and a half centuries, are now required to compete in the open market with those who have been more favorably circumstanced for several centuries (Chandler, 1983, P. 223).

A further review of Florida's public education for blacks underscores a history of repeated discrimination. According to the 1930 state census, blacks constituted 30 percent of the state's total population, yet they accounted for more than 80 percent of the illiterates. The high illiteracy rate among the state's blacks had adverse effects in local communities and also reduced drastically the potential enrollment of students from the college-age cohort (the 18-24-year age group).

Like other black colleges, FAMU, with an inadequate operating budget, had the major responsibility for educating black students. Yet until after the 1920s, FAMU was little more than a secondary school. For example, in the early 1930s, FAMU enrolled 226 high school students

and 280 college students (Chandler, 1983, P. 226). A 1947 act further specified that both Florida State University and the University of Florida "would be restrictive to white students, and that Florida A & M College would be limited to 'Negro male and Negro female students'" (Chandler, 1983, P. 226).

Desegregation Litigation

As blacks throughout the nation struggled for equal education opportunities in higher education, Florida blacks were seeking admission to TWIs. The first black to request admittance to a TWI was Virgil Hawkins, a Gainesville resident who, in 1949, applied to the University of Florida (UF) Law School. Hawkins spent nine years in court before the Florida Supreme Court, in a 5-2 split decision, ruled that he could not be denied admission to the University solely on the basis of race. The University responded by raising its admission standards and, consequently, denying Hawkins admission. It also constructed a college of law at Florida's TBI, FAMU, to keep blacks away from Florida's TWIs (Weinberg, 1977, P. 299).

During the nine years Hawkins was fighting to gain access to UF, he was subjected to harrassment and intimidation. In addition, after the Florida Supreme Court ruled in 1955 that UF could not discriminate against him on the basis of race, a lower court ordered that a public opinion survey be conducted on the issue. Given the existence of Florida's Jim Crow laws at that time, the survey results are not surprising. Public opinion indicated the following: 50 percent of the alumni threatened to cut off financial endowments to the University; two-fifths of the parents of students threatened to withdraw or transfer

their children from the University; and three-fifths of the parents of white high school graduates responded that they would not permit their children to attend a desegregated public university. These attitudes, in the context of a Jim Crow legal system, are indicative of constraints on the formulation of public policy that would be favorable to Hawkins and to the black communities in general. In the end, Hawkins was not permitted to attend UF (Weinberg, 1977, Pp. 299-300).

Several southern and border universities grudgingly admitted a few blacks to their graduate schools, but nearly all the students were admitted during the summer term, and their academic concentration was education. As one graduate dean made clear, "we refused admissions of Negroes to all departments until required to do so by court order" (Weinberg, 1977, P. 300).

Hawkins' difficulty in gaining admission to UF reflected a pattern established by other southern universities as well to discourage black access to TWI graduate schools. They forced black applicants to fight long legal battles to gain entry. Although each victory was important, each addressed only the grievances of the respective black applicant. The one-by-one admission strategy established by southern universities was widely embraced during the late 1950s and early 1960s, and Hawkins' challenge to discrimination in graduate and professional education underscored the protracted nature of this strategy (Weinberg, 1977, Pp. 399-300).

Continued efforts against inequality in higher education culminated in a 1957 Tallahassee bus boycott organized by FAMU black students. The governor initiated a high-level conference of state political and

educational leaders. According to Chandler (1983, P. 232), the conference's purposes were to determine 1) the course to follow in obtaining a review of the 1955 Florida Supreme Court decision in the Hawkins' case; 2) what effective and legally sound action the state might take to meet the crisis presented by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Brown case; and 3) what precautions to take to prevent further deterioration in race relations.

As a result of his conference, Governor Collins, who had also endorsed segregation in his 1954 and 1956 gubernatorial campaigns, was authorized to appoint a blue ribbon committee to develop a proposal designed to maintain segregated public institutions. The attorney general and the state board of education were charged with similar responsibilities. Governor Collins stated that his office would not implement the higher education desegregation order unless specifically ordered to do so:

> The U. S. Supreme Court decision in the Brown case left many questions regarding education and other issues unanswered. We knew the ruling had application to the public schools, but there was no indication at the time it would apply to higher education. Our state law and constitution at the time required that we operate segregated schools and universities. (Chandler, 1983, P. 232)

Collins also initiated several legislative bills designed to further maintain segregation in public institutions.

In spite of resistance to desegregating Florida public institutions, the first black was admitted to a professional school in the State University System (SUS) of Higher Education (to the UF College of Law) in 1958. Subsequently, the first black was admitted to

undergraduate school in the SUS (to the University of South Florida) in 1961. Since the State Board of Regents was established in 1965, only five blacks have served on it, and three of those were Student Regents (Chandler, 1983, P. 237).

New universities and colleges built in Florida after 1960 were opened on an integrated basis, and although, by 1970, most colleges and universities throughout the country were desegregated, desegregation in the South continued to proceed slowly. In an effort to speed it up, the LDF filed suit in federal district court in Washington, D.C. to require HEW to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VI states, in part, that

> No person in the United States shall, on the basis of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. (Chandler, 1983, P 238)

Barring blacks from attending TWIs was the rule, not the exception, prior to the 1970s. However, the practice of segregation in higher education was legally challenged in Adams v. Richardson.

Florida, one of the original Adams states, filed its compliance plan with HEW on June 5, 1973. HEW rejected "A Plan for Equalizing Education Opportunity in the State University System" on February 10, 1974, because it lacked specificity about how Florida intended to dismantle its dual university system (Prestage, 1982, P. 92).

On February 17, 1974, Florida filed with HEW a two-volume plan entitled "Plans for Equalizing Education Opportunities in Public Higher Education in Florida." HEW rejected the plan on April 17, 1974. In

response to HEW's criticism of the plans' deficiencies, Florida submitted a "Supplement to Volume 1: Special Affirmations and Actions of the Plans for Equalizing Educational Opportunity in Public Higher Education in Florida." HEW approved this document on June 21, 1974.

Adams case plaintiffs took issue with HEW's approval and, in August, 1975, went to court again. The Court responded by requiring Florida and six other states to submit "new desegregation plans and to set specific standards for those plans" (Prestage, 1982, P. 93). On September 9, 1977, Florida submitted its new plan, "Florida's Commitment to Equal Access and Equal Opportunity in Public Higher Education in Florida." Once again, HEW rejected the document because it lacked specificity (Haynes, 1980, P. 541).

Undaunted, Florida officials submitted other plans--"The State University System Revised Plan for Equalizing Educational Opportunity in Public Higher Education in Florida" (October 12, 1977) and "State Equal Access-Equal Opportunity Plan for the Florida Public Community College System" (November, 1977). The HEW Secretary, Joseph Califano, approved these plans, but, because Florida was too slow in implementing them, in 1978 HEW asked for a new plan (Prestage, 1982, Pp. 92-94).

During 1978-84, the above scenario was repeated at least four times. First, Florida submitted a plan; then HEW (now the Department of Education or DE) accepted the plan. LDF or some other group committed to integrating southern institutions criticized the plan as "unacceptable" and pressured DE and the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) to reject the plan. DE withdrew its support of the plan and ordered Florida to submit a new plan or forfeit its federal funding. Florida

submitted a new plan, and the pattern repeated itself (Prestage, 1982, Pp. 92-94). Apparently, Florida officials do not intend to voluntarily comply with the Adams decree. In fact, one high-ranking official recently stated that the Adams criteria were "completely unrealistic" (Farrell, February 8, 1984, P. 13).

While DE, LDF, OCR, and Florida officials wage legal battles, the state's black population remains underrepresented at all levels in TWIs. The number of first-time black students enrolled in the Florida SUS has steadily decreased from a high of 2,748 (15.8%) in 1979 to 1,323 (14.0%) in 1982 (Fairfax, 1984, P. 5). Blacks are also underrepresented in graduate and professional schools, tenured faculty positions, administrative posts, and governance boards (Pruitt, 1981). To complicate matters, Florida officials regularly report data that is inaccurate and inconsistent (Fairfax, 1984, P. 1).

As principal reasons for their failure to enroll and retain more black students, TWIs cite poor educational preparation and lack of finances on the part of the students. However, Doug Turner, the UF Student Financial Aid Director, noted that black students leave school because they lack finances, not because they are academically incompetent. According to Turner, "Special admission students have to walk a delicate tightrope." If they work too much, they are likely to flunk out because they have so little time to study. "But if they don't work, they probably can't make enough money to stay in school" (Chandler, 1983, P. 240). This is the type of atmosphere that hinders the implementation of desegregation policies.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH DESIGN

This chapter discusses contextual analysis as background for using the case study method; explains the case study method, data collection tools (unstructured interviews and document analysis), and the rationale for site selection; and explicates the policy system model.

Environmental Factors: A Contextual Analysis

Public policy is not made in a vacuum. It is an outcome of a complex process in which both internal (organizational influences) and external (environmental influences) factors interact in ways that reflect the organization in a particular environmental setting. The environment includes all social, economic, and political factors that affect policy statements, actions, and outcomes.

Environmental factors relevant to empirical research are usually classified as existing statistics. In addition, they are considered a "supplemental" data source. Thus, existing statistical information often "provides a historical or conceptual context within which to locate your original research" (Babbie, 1979, P. 290). The environmental factors utilized in this study are intended to provide a context from which to interpret variations in our data; thus, they will not be treated as the explanatory variables. However, these indicators

are important to examine because of the extent to which they initially support or resist policy changes and provide indications of both the salience of a particular issue and the ease with which it will be addressed. Examining the saliency of environmental factors provides insight about their influence on organizational behavior in the context of public policymaking.

Few organizations experience significant changes without support or resistance within their policy-relevant environment, i.e., from the groups they serve and/or from those to whom they are accountable (Peterson, et al., 1978, P. 106). For example, instances of high political demand and/or involvement usually emanate from communities of high-income, well-educated people, especially in states with intense competition among the two major political parties. Low political demand, on the other hand, usually occurs in "poorer, less-educated areas, especially where there is a single-party domination, a history of discouraging the participation of the poor and blacks" (Sharkansky & Van Meter, 1975, P. 8). Party competition is not a factor discussed in this study, but this particular variable did offer some insight into the extent and nature of black political demands in our case study states. The notion of party competition/noncompetition will be discussed briefly under the political influences sub-section.

Other external influences may be reflected in a region's demographic makeup (e.g., population composition and concentration in the state or region); the political participation rates and representation in the state or region (e.g., voter registration/turnout rates and the racial/ethnic make-up of elected officials, respectively);

economic assets (e.g., median income, unemployment rates, income gaps between racial/ethnic groups); and educational resources (e.g., size and diversity of student populations, administrators, faculty, and board members and the presence or absence of campus-based affirmative action programs). For our study, we use the distribution of blacks on the above indicators as an "indirect" measure of support or resistance for carrying out the mandate of a particular public policy issue relevant to the black community (National Advisory Committee, 1980, P. 11).

Political Factors

Decisions to implement public policy occur within a political context. The policy-making process is susceptible to political pressure, and the level of black political participation is an important factor with direct and/or indirect impact on the public policy process (i.e., policy statement, action and outcome variables), especially in higher education (Stone, 1968; Wolman & Thomas, 1977). The political factors selected for this study fall in both categories. However, those directly influencing the policy process were given the most attention. Prestage (1982, P. 103) argues that, in states with higher rates of black participation (especially blacks holding political office in the state legislature), blacks will more likely succeed in shaping public policy (see also National Advisory Committee, 1980, P. 11).

A. Electoral Trends--Florida

Since its formation, the Florida legislature has been primarily conservative, even after the process of reapportionment and a trend toward a two-party state in the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections (Chandler, 1983, P. 7). However, population shifts and the 1980

reapportionment did bring some new faces to the legislature. By 1982, there were only five black legislators (all in the House of Representatives) in the Florida legislature, representing three percent of the 160 members. By 1983, reapportionment brought 10 black state representatives and two black state senators (see Table 11). Other increased representation in the legislature included an increase from two to four Hispanic representatives and from four to nine women senators.

Another factor contributing to this legislative change was a switch from multi-member to single-member districts, also initiated by the 1980 reapportionment. During our Florida site visit, a respondent in the state legislature noted that blacks in the legislature have introduced a progressive element and added that the new legislators have sensitized the legislative body, to some extent, to the plight of minorities. Given the black and Hispanic concentration in the south Florida area, these legislators generally represent "safe seats," thus disproportionately increasing their power in the legislature.

Florida is one of 22 states with a black population comprising 20 percent or more of the voting-age population in a U. S. Congressional District. The voting potential of blacks and other racial minorities in those 22 states has resulted in 20 congressional seats held by blacks, nine held by Hispanics, and four held by Japanese Americans. In addition, 19 cities of 100,000 or more population have black mayors (Cavanagh, 1984, P. 10). However, for blacks to be effectively elected to Florida state and local government offices, black voter participation rates must also increase. For example, in the 1982 gubernatorial race,

black-to-white registration was 50.3 to 60.8 percent. Black and white turnout rates were 30.4 and 43.1 percent respectively (see Table 8). These facts, coupled with a multi-member district formula for electing state representatives, account for the low number of blacks elected to state and county offices (see Table 7). The percentage difference between black and white registration and turnout rates corresponds to the same percentage difference between black and whites nationally on these same indicators (see Table 9).

The strategic representation of blacks on key legislative committees can "affect the course and the form of various legislative initiatives" (Green, 1982, P. 25). During our Florida site visit, a legislative aid told us that one of the newly-elected black state senators had initiated--and had successfully garnered the necessary senate votes to pass--financial aide legislation on behalf of black professional students. A proportional distribution of blacks on house and senate committees is important for significant changes to occur (see Table 11). According to Glenny, Shea, Ruyle and Fresch (1976, P. 79), "one reason often given by state political leaders for assuming authority over public institutions is that higher education fails to respond to the needs of students and society without prodding, planning, and initiative from the state level." Social traditions, even discriminatory ones, generally remain intact unless prompted or persuaded to change.

B. Electoral Trends--Oklahoma

The prodding, planning, and initiative on the part of state legislators that Glenny, Shea, Ruyle and Fresch (1976) addressed was

also evident in our Oklahoma case study. In fact, Oklahoma black elected officials are the main force behind monitoring efforts of the State Regents for Higher Education and the universities to comply with the Adams guidelines. The efforts of a key legislator led to the formulation of a Special House of Representatives Committee on Affirmative Action in Higher Education to oversee and monitor the efforts of the Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education to comply with affirmative action policy directives. Oklahoma has two black Senate and three black House of Representatives members. The two state senators serve on six different standing committees, while the three House members serve on 10 different standing committees (see Table 10).

Oklahoma voter registration and turnout rates show a smaller gap between blacks and whites than do Florida's (see Table 8). For example, voter registration in Oklahoma for 1982 statewide elections was 59.2 percent for blacks and 63.3 percent for whites. Voter turnout for the same year's statewide election in Florida was 44.9 percent for blacks and 47.5 percent for whites. Of Florida's blacks, 50.3 percent were registered to vote for 1982 statewide elections, compared with 59.2 percent of Oklahoma's blacks--a nine-percentage-point difference. Voter turnout rates show an even larger difference between Florida and Oklahoma blacks. Florida blacks had a 30.4 percent voter turnout rate, compared with a 44.9 percent turnout in Oklahoma--a 14-percentage-point difference. The higher voter registration/turnout rate for Oklahoma blacks compared with Florida blacks is reflected further in a greater percentage of Oklahoma blacks elected to state and county offices than was the case in Florida prior to 1983.

Demographic Factors

Demographics also influence the policy-making process. Racial minorities are increasing their power and influence in proportion to their population numbers. The 26.4 million blacks reported by the Bureau of the Census for 1980 account for 11.7 percent of the population; many of these blacks live in states such as New York, California, Illinois, and Florida, where they could play a key role in presidential, senatorial and gubernatorial elections. Hispanics, whose numbers increased by 61 percent in the 1970s and who now total about 16 million, are expected to surpass blacks and become the largest racial minority in another decade. Although the black birth rate is less than the Hispanic, it is higher than the white birth rate and is expected to significantly increase in coming years (American Association, 1983, P. 4).

The Census Bureau reported that a previous trend of blacks leaving the South during the 1960s reversed during the 1970s and that, by 1980, more blacks were returning to the South than were leaving. As a result, more than half of all blacks (14.1 million) still reside in the South. Although, blacks make up 18.6 percent of the South's population, this number represents a one-percent decrease over the decade after a significant movement of whites into the Sunbelt and the arrival of many Hispanics in Texas and Florida (American Association, 1983, P. 4).

The higher black-to-white birth rate significantly affects the U. S. college-age cohort population (18-24 years). For example, as of 1982, blacks comprised 13.4 percent of this cohort but only 11.7 percent of the general population (see Table 12). In the South's college-age cohort population, blacks were almost 20 percent in 1980, and that

proportion is predicted to exceed 30 percent by 1990. Similarly, Hispanics make up 30 percent of the college-age cohort and are expected to reach 50 percent by 1990 in some southern states (American Association, 1983, P. 4). Thus, the proportion of blacks and Hispanics in the South's college-age cohort population by 1990 will equal nearly one-half the cohort population. Ignoring the educational needs of nearly 50 percent of the population will be increasingly difficult, even though that group suffers the traditional stigma of being composed of minorities.

Most large states presently enroll a very high percentage of minority students in public secondary schools, including 33 percent in Florida. The percentages are even higher in elementary schools than in secondary schools, suggesting that the future will bring even more minority students to the high school availability pool. The implication of these trends is that "the secure retirement of today's 45-year-old white worker will be increasingly dependent upon the economy's ability to generate jobs for a higher percentage of minorities among today's youth." Thus, for objective interests and future planning, it behooves institutions of higher education "to do everything to make sure that the largest possible number of minority students do well in public schools and thus become college eligible" (American Association, 1983, P. 4).

If public institutions of higher education address the issue of the racial/ethnic make-up of the student cohorts that will be available to them, they will also be better prepared to meet the future's labor force participation needs. The statistics indicate that the most vulnerable institutions will be small, liberal arts private colleges and

universities that have traditionally relied on attracting a white, middle-class, suburban student body. There simply will not be enough of these students for all the TWIs in the near future (American Association, 1983, P. 5). College costs complicate the situation even further; as they increase, the proportional black enrollment can be expected to decrease, further decreasing the college-age availability pool (Abramowitz, 1976, Pp. 125).

In reference to increasing black enrollment in higher education, Peterson, et al. (1978, Pp. 106-107) argue that the black population's size in a particular locality is an indirect determinant of support for resistance to increasing black enrollments in higher education. In 1980, for example, Florida's population was 77 percent white, 13 percent black, and nine percent Hispanic (see Table 13). Florida's college-age cohort population is 16.9 percent black, nearly four percent higher than Florida's general black population (see Tables 13 and 14). This fact indicates a consistent increase in the black population's size, especially those 18-24. In 1980, Oklahoma's population was 84.3 percent white, 6.6 percent black and 9.1 percent Native American and other. Oklahoma's college-age cohort population is 8.5 percent black, nearly two percent higher than the state's general black population (see Tables 14 and 15).

Florida's population is growing much faster than is Oklahoma's. As a result, Florida's population explosion has implications for the number and location of universities and colleges in the state. According to Peterson, et al. (1978, P. 112), the availability of institutions of higher education in a state is "another external factor which can

support or limit an institution's attempt to increase black enrollments." If there are not enough universities willing to accommodate all the college-age students who seek admittance, then black enrollments cannot increase.

Economic Factors

In a survey of students who applied for need-based financial aid to attend professional or graduate school, minorities were more likely to choose "cannot afford to attend" as the major reason for not attending after being accepted (Flamer, Horch & Davis, 1982, P. 4). Another study points out that income is a greater determinant of whether a black student stays in college than is race per se, since blacks disproportionately fall into a lower income category than do whites. A comparison of low-income or "high-risk" black and white students reveals similar attrition rates (American Association, 1983, P. 4). Moreover, Abramowitz (1976, Pp. 98, 101) points out that increased income distribution among blacks reduces the difference between black and white (upper income) participation in higher education by 71 percent, leaving 39 percent to be explained by "categorical barriers" (racial discrimination), "educational barriers" (institutional policies and practices), and "psychosocial barriers" (negative student attitudes). According to Blackwell (1981, Pp. 24-25), blacks face at least five other barriers to higher education: 1) high unemployment rates, 2) inadequate income to support students in higher-education programs, 3) low occupational status, 4) limited access to scholarships and fellowships, and 5) fear of excessive indebtedness from loan programs.

Black family income is one indicator of black financial need. In 1980, the black median family income was $13,989, well below the white median income of $24,176 (see Table 16). The $13,989 median black family income represents approximately 41 percent of all black families, compared to the $24,176 median white family income that represents 48 percent of all white families (Perlo, 1975, P. 49; National Urban League, 1984, P. 172).

Poverty and persons below the poverty level exacerbate the financial crisis of black Americans. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 34.2 percent blacks, as compared with 11.1 percent whites, were below the poverty level in 1981 (see Table 17)--a rise in the overall poverty rate to 14 percent. In light of these facts, John Jacob of the National Urban League contends that "while white Americans celebrate a long-overdue economic recovery and a falling unemployment rate, black America is buried in a depression of crushing proportions." Jacob adds that, nationally, black unemployment hovers around 18 percent, 30 percent of black workers between 20 and 24 are unemployed, and 50 percent of all black children live in households below the poverty level (Blacks Are in Depression, January 20, 1984, P. 6).

In Oklahoma and Florida, family incomes were lower for blacks than for whites, demonstrating a greater black student financial aid need. In the respective case study states, family incomes were even lower for blacks in Florida than in Oklahoma (see Table 18). Further examination of family incomes in Oklahoma and Florida cities with the most blacks reveals that blacks also fared better in Oklahoma than in Florida.

Educational Factors

A final environmental factor is education, a category of indicators that includes the size and distribution of the black student body in those institutions that provide the pool for graduate education. The undergraduate conduits that prepare black students to enter graduate school are plagued with high attrition. As of 1980, 83 percent whites, compared with 72 percent blacks, graduated from high school; 38 percent whites, compared with 29 percent blacks, entered college; 23 percent whites, compared with 12 percent blacks, completed college; 14 percent whites, compared with eight percent blacks, entered graduate school; and eight percent whites, compared with four percent blacks, completed graduate/professional school. The percentages in each group are based on the number of students who entered high school (see Table 19).

Evidence suggests that black students are being relegated to two-year colleges and are being tracked away from the institutions that typically supply the undergraduate pool for graduate education. Abramowitz (1976, P. 152) found that approximately 40 percent of all black college students in 1973 were in two-year institutions. Brazziel and Brazziel (1980, P. 19) found a similar pattern in the 19 Adams states, "with 36 percent of the black students enrolled in two-year colleges in 1976." Although these statistics are alarming, they are an improvement over the earlier 40 percent concentration of black students reported in 1973. Furthermore, it is estimated that, of all black full-time students enrolled in two-year colleges as of 1976, 57 percent transferred to a senior institution (Abramowitz, 1976, P. 153). However, a 1981 report (Text, February 3, 1982, P. 3) found that, of those two-year college students desiring to transfer to a four-year

institution, only 25 percent actually did so. The suspicion that blacks are not being encouraged to attend colleges that will lead them to graduate degree programs seems verified. But even when two-year students do transfer to four-year institutions, they often remain at a disadvantage because they lack "resources and services that are ordinarily available to entering freshmen - for example, financial aid and orientation" (Text, February 3, 1982, P. 3).

Finally, much direct aid to graduate students from universities occurs as teaching and research assistantships. Professor/mentors tend to select graduate students proteges to work with them in teaching and research who share their own social characteristics, e.g., class, race, and sex (Fuchs-Epstein, 1970; Morris, 1979). Thus, grants are filtered through a sponsor-protege system. The distribution and rank of black faculty, administrators and board members may affect the allocation of direct grants to black graduate students. Faculty serve as role models in the socialization/education process of graduate students. Black graduate students will have a difficult time locating black mentors or role models because of the miniscule number of blacks on graduate faculties. (For a distribution of black faculty in the Oklahoma and Florida state university systems, see Tables 20 and 21.) Black faculty underrepresentation further results in majority faculty members' failure to recognize and support minority-oriented research and cultural interests (Text, February 3, 1982, P. 3). Black faculty distribution in major universities is significant given the fact that the major predictor of black student enrollment and graduation is the actual presence and number of black faculty (Blackwell, 1981).

Minority faculty and administrators are often hired in areas designed as "minority" positions, often part-time and short-term and supported by "soft" money (Text, February 3, 1982, P. 3). Pruitt's (1981, P. 22) examination of employment data from 232 formerly all-white institutions revealed little progress for black faculty and administrators. White males dominated the highest salary levels, while black females ranked the lowest. Black faculty were the least likely to have tenure, and few held faculty positions of high rank (Egerton, 1981, P. 12). The distribution of black faculty in Oklahoma and Florida conforms to these patterns and tendencies (see Tables 22 and 23).

The Case Study Method

Comparative case study is characterized by intensively examining a small number of cases. A case study probes the subject matter's history and development in order to understand the life cycle, or an important part of the life cycle, of an individual unit (Best, 1970, P. 127). The focus may be individuals, situations, groups, organizations, states, and so forth (Selltiz, Jaboda, Deutsch, & Cook, 1959, P. 60). This method also intensively examines interaction between those factors that produce change. It stresses a "genetic" approach, showing development over time (Best, 1970, P. 127).

We selected the case study method for several reasons. First, our subject matter is relatively unstudied and warrants an exploratory approach, and the case study method is amenable to exploratory research (Lijphard, 1971, P. 692). Second, this study's manifest goal is to gather both qualitative and quantitative data on the plight of black doctoral students, and the case study approach can accommodate both

forms of data. Third, the comparative case study method helps the analysis emphasize similarities and/or distinctions between Oklahoma and Florida. That is, focusing on the interstate and intrastate nature of the issue allowed for viewing the two states together and analyzing their relationships. Finally, the case study approach allows an emphasis on process-oriented phenomena that describe the development of desegregation in higher education.

For the purposes of this research, the main objectives of the case study approach are describing and analyzing financial aid compliance policies and administrative practices and procedures in the two selected states. The case study method provides practical information, uncovers sociological and public policy insights, and reveals strategies that should help various decision makers better implement financial aid policies in the area of black graduate student subsidy. More specific objectives in this analysis include

1) disseminating information for use in implementing public policy;

2) generating information unobtainable through national survey data;

3) furthering understanding about the administrative process and how it relates to policy effectiveness;

4) highlighting "ideal" administrative practices and procedures that might be viewed as prototypes for more effective policy implementation and monitoring;

5) emphasizing similarities and/or distinctions across various aspects of the case study states--e.g., across state and local agencies or among policymakers and other participants.

Selection of Case Study States

The research project's selection phase sought to examine in detail the operation of state programs that were designed to increase black access to and completion of doctoral programs. Our aim was to analyze specific practices and procedures used to eliminate financial barriers that prevent blacks from completing their doctoral programs. Although document analysis (census data, memos, etc.) was used to provide a comprehensive view of the public policy environment (political, demographic, economic, and educational factors), unstructured interviews were used to enable us to determine the operation of state programs that affect administrative practices and policy effectiveness (i.e., implementation of financial compliance polices on behalf of blacks in the Adams states). Hence, we examined the governance structure of the state university system responsible for determining and enforcing compliance with the financial aid policy for black students.

Our task was to generate useful information about how a state agency's policies and administrative procedures actually work in practice. We did so by identifying a state's organizational characteristics as reflected in agency policies, goals, objectives and regulations. Consequently, we used the case study method 1) to identify any relationships between organizational characteristics, environmental factors, and effectiveness in formulating and implementing financial aid plans that facilitate doctoral degree completion by blacks and, where possible, 2) to then compare the plans' relative successes.

As suggested earlier, the case study's major advantage is that a few cases can be intensively examined, even when research resources are

relatively limited (Lijphart, 1971, P. 691). Because of constraints on time, personnel, and funds, analyzing policy implementation in all 19 Adams states would not have been feasible. A more plausible solution was to intensely study two states and compare the data. We selected Oklahoma and Florida as the Adams case study sites for the following reasons:

1. access to State Adams Plan and Annual Reports prepared for OCR (Florida and Oklahoma);
2. oldest Adams State Plan (Oklahoma);
3. large black population (Florida);
4. significant number of blacks elected to the state legislature (Florida); and
5. as a result of the Adams guidelines, both Florida and Oklahoma track their black doctoral students and have data available on the number of blacks participating in and completing a doctoral degree program.

The case study method is useful for developing theoretical generalizations. Lijphart (1971, P. 685) suggests using the comparative case study as the first stage of research; in this stage, hypotheses are extracted and formulated. The second stage consists of the statistical analysis in which these hypotheses are tested against as large a sample as possible. This study starts with several general hypotheses in an attempt to formulate more definitive statements that can be tested in subsequent studies.

Unstructured Interviews

Since one of this study's goals was to gather data descriptive of the perceptions of policymakers and significant others regarding Adams criteria implementation, two of the investigators traveled to Florida

and Oklahoma and conducted unstructured interviews. The interviews provided a way for respondents to express their views freely. In both states, politicians, educators, college administrators, state education officials, affirmative action personnel, and community leaders were interviewed. For purposes of methodological comparability, an effort was made to interview persons in Florida and Oklahoma holding positions of similar or comparable stature. Thirty-six interviews--17 in Oklahoma and 19 in Florida--were conducted. (See Appendix II for a copy of the interview schedule document.)

The relaxed atmosphere of the interviews yielded a wealth of data. When respondents answered vaguely, we had ample flexibility to probe for more specific responses while maintaining a cooperative atmosphere. Also, unstructured interviews allowed the respondents to go beyond facts and express their views and give their insights on various issues. For example, one FAMU dean had extensively studied issues related to the Adams criteria. He talked for two hours about the mandate's history, the reactions of various persons toward implementing the guidelines, and the guidelines' current status in Florida. A structered interview would not have elicited this information. Unstructured interviews are especially effective for studying the subtle nuances of attitudes and behaviors (Babbie, 1979, P. 227).

The atmosphere in which the unstructured interviews were conducted led to candid responses. Most interviewees openly criticized the performance of others involved in implementing the Adams guidelines; OCR, LDF, the Board of Regents, and education officials did not emerge

untouched by these critiques. On the other hand, each respondent openly praised persons who were "doing a good job." These varied perceptions were easily analyzed in the open-systems model used in this study.

According to Dexter (1970, P. 5), this approach is formally referred to as an "elite" or specialized interviewing technique that is best suited for interviewing people in important or exposed positions on topics relating to their prominence. The technique is employed with the infuential, the prominent, and the well-known (rather than with a populations's rank and file), because most elite persons are reluctant to follow the line of inquiry the investigator establishes. According to Dexter (1970, P. 5), in a standardized interviewing approach, the researcher defines the question and the problem and looks for responses only within the bounds set by his or her presuppositions. Thus, the standardized interviewing approach, unlike the non-standardized approach,

1) stresses the interviewee's definition of the situation;

2) encourages the interviewee to structure the account of the situation;

3) allows the interviewee to introduce to a considerable extent his/her opinions of what he/she regards as relevant, instead of relying upon the investigator's notion of relevance.

In other words, in elite, specialized or non-standardized interviewing, the researcher is willing (because of the study's exploratory nature) to allow the interviewee to teach the researcher the nature and scope of the problem, the question or the situation.

Another important distinction is that, in the standardized interview (the typical survey), a deviant finding or response is usually handled statistically; in an elite interview, on the other hand, a

deviation, exception or unanticipated response "may suggest a revision, a reinterpretation, an extension, a new approach" (Dexter, 1970, P. 6). The flexibility of this method and technique proved useful during our data collection efforts in the field.

Finally, the elite interviewing approach places less emphasis on the particular persons being interviewed than on the important or elite positions they hold in a particular hierarchial unit. The responses of persons in selected positions become the units of analysis, which are, of course, standardized. Consequently, the number of persons interviewed in important or elite positions or the balance between these persons' positive/negative responses is not central to the survey technique (Dexter, 1970).

During the interviews, an abundance of data was collected that seemed irrelevant to our model. Later, with a broader perspective, much of these data also became useful. We recognized from the outset that the unstructured interview had some problemmatic features; therefore, we modified our design as necessary. The most prevalent criticism of unstructured interviews is the likelihood of interviewer bias.

One could, for example, excerpt dramatic rather than representative statements. To avoid this, two interviewers conferred with participants, they excerpted their notes independently, and then reconciled discrepancies. Thus, inter-rater reliability was established.

The researcher who uses unstructured interviews is confronted by another obstacle: faulty reporting by the respondents. In this study, the problem manifested itself in interviewees overstating their opinions

to the point of exaggeration. In some instances, interviewees gave accounts of certain situations that totally contradicted the accounts given by other interviewees. But these different, often conflict-oriented interpretations are a valuable source of data. In the study's analytical stage, these data were crucial for discerning feelings of cooperation and antagonism and for determining their impact on Adams criteria implementation.

Another common criticism is that unstructured interviews are not useful for statistical analysis. To circumvent this problem, additional data, of a more quantitative nature, were collected from numerous documents and statistics provided by state officials. These data contain information that each state has tabulated and recorded; they provide a reliable and convenient method of observing trends or fluctuations in the number of students enrolled or graduating at different levels of higher education.

Respondents' names were obtained from university bulletins and state brochures. Interviews were conducted during on-site visits to Florida and Oklahoma. They were scheduled at the convenience of the respondents and averaged about one hour. Each interview was tape recorded, and tapes were transcribed and critiqued by research team members.

Although respondents were free to answer questions in any manner they deemed relevant, comparisons were made through a standardized interview schedule (see Appendix II), which addressed the following general areas of concern.

1) The nature and scope (amount of financial aid, type of aid, etc.) of each state's financial aid plan for black doctoral degree students.

2) The method used to provide financial aid to doctoral students (i.e., how financial aid is provided to black doctoral students).

3) Who is involved in the process (i.e., identifying the persons involved and their specific responsibility for implementing a financial aid plan on behalf of black students).

4) The nature of the interaction between persons involved in formulating and implementing the Adams state financial aid plan on behalf of black students.

5) Identifying procedures, policies and promising practices linked to specific policy outcomes (i.e., the number of black doctoral students graduating as a result of specific financial aid practices, procedures or policies).

These five areas were the focal points for each interview and served as the major points of comparison in subsequent analysis.

Document Analysis

To complement the data collected through unstructured interviews, we also used substantial document analysis. This procedure consisted of critically examining relevant materials and documents to discern behavior patterns. Prior to the Oklahoma and Florida site visits, we analyzed each state's approved Adams plan and each respective annual report up to 1983 or the last reporting year. Additional data were collected from census reports, newspapers, brochures, newsletters, and OCR and LDF reports. While conducting the site visits, we collected supplements to state plans, letters, and memos.

As stated earlier, an underlying assumption of this study was that environmental factors greatly impact upon the opportunities available to blacks to enter and complete doctoral programs (Green, 1982; Blackwell, 1981). These relevant environmental factors are best illustrated through an analysis of the documents we collected. As noted in the

earlier discussion, the specific environmental factors central to this study are political, demographic, economic, and educational. Conceptually, these factors were typologized in the following manner.

Environmental Factors

1. Political

   a. Black voting-age population, number of blacks registered, and black turn-out rates in the respective Adams states.

   b. Distribution of blacks elected to state legislative offices and their distribution on educationally related legislative committees.

   c. Black appointed officials to educational policy areas (boards of trustees, boards of regents).

   d. Legislative mandates, i.e., affirmative action legislation and tax revolt legislation.

   e. Litigation and court orders.

2. Demographic

   a. Size of black population by state.

   b. Proportion of blacks in college-age cohort (18-24 years).

3. Economic

   a. Form of state financial aid package for graduate education.

   b. Aggregate economic data for blacks

      - income levels
      - unemployment
      - mean family income
      - percent of blacks below the poverty level.

4. Educational

   a. Size of university/college system.

   b. Number of university-based affirmative action grant programs.

   c. Distribution of black faculty, administrators, and board of trustee members.

   d. Level of black educational attainment by states.

This report presents environmental data in prose and in tables, depending on the context. Regardless of the presentation method, the data provide a useful background for the unstructured interviews. For example, the data helped us formulate questions to be included on the interview schedule. In addition, the environmental data helped us understand the historical and the current status of Florida and Oklahoma blacks.

In short, data collected from unstructured interviews constitute our primary method of tapping organizational characteristics, whereas we examined environmental factors through document analysis. Figure 1 presents our research strategies graphically.

Figure 1: Research Model

INPUT	POLICY	OUTPUT
	(Financial Aid Programs for Graduate Education)	
Environment	Organizational Characteristics	Black Enrollment in and Completion of Ph.D. Programs
Political		
Demographic		
Economic		
Educational		

Policy System Model

The policy system model employed in this study is a series of interrelationships among variables: policy-relevant environmental factors, policy statements, policy action, and policy outcome variables (Ripley, 1972, Pp. 6-20). For this study, the policy-relevant environment includes those factors (i.e., political, demographic, economic and educational) that directly or indirectly, intended or unintended, influence the policy-making process. These factors need not be consciously identified by policy makers, but they are factors affecting public policy, and, at a minimum, they provide a context for interpreting and analyzing public policy.

Policy statement variables are the official statements of intent made by policy makers in reference to a particular policy mandate. The actors or policy makers issuing declarations of intent in the form of policy statements vary considerably, depending on their position and responsibility in a specific government unit (Ripley, 1972, P. 8).

Policy actions (or implementation) refer to a "tangible manifestation of policy." Policy actions are what the various government units do in the policy-making process. Similar to policy statements, policy actions may involve a number of specific "acts" designed to address some aspect of the policy statement (Ripley, 1972, Pp. 8-9). Policy actions identified for this study include monitoring procedures, committee formation, and fund allocation.

Policy outcomes involve the benefits received as a result of specific policy statements and actions (Ripley, 1972, P. 8). More specifically, policy outcomes require an evaluation of policy actions

along the same dimension as the intended policy statements. In this study, policy outcomes are examined for consistency or inconsistency with the intended policy statements. They are also judged by a critical audience of significant others outside the formal policy-making process. The significant or interested others represent the recipients or beneficiaries of the intended policy actions. Categorically, policy outcomes encompass a range of responses by a government unit to its recipients or beneficiaries. Ripley (1972, P. 6) offers five possible types of government responses: 1) no response (failing to act constitutes a policy outcome); 2) a response of affirmation (that is, maintaining present conditions and patterns); 3) a response of adjustment (openly acknowledging existing conditions, patterns and trends, without attempting to change them); 4) a response of manipulation (trying to use conditions, patterns and trends in the environment to facilitate the achievement of specific goals); and, finally, 5) a response aimed at changing or altering the environment (attempting to redefine environment conditions as a basis for reformulating a specific policy response). These five types of government response are used in categorizing and analyzing policy outcomes.

The policy process through which both policy statements and policy actions emerge is facilitated to a large degree by the interrelationship between policy makers involved both in policy statements and in policy actions (i.e., those who are involved in the process and the nature of interactions between the persons involved--cooperative, conflictual, or conciliatory). The policy process also includes elements normally

circumscribed by specific government units (Ripley, 1972, Pp. 6-8): characteristics and norms relating to personnel (e.g., a variety of structural characteristics, role orientations, and perceptions about leadership) and characteristics and norms relating to the internal decision-making process (e.g., scope and nature of authority, knowledge and interpretation of policy, level of communication, incentives and sanctions, and acceptance and non-acceptance of policy). This study focuses on the "processes" of policy making and on its "substance," which also serves as a vehicle for studying the policy process.

This analysis conceives the policy system as an "open" system in which conditions are constantly in flux and in which adaptation is more important than equilibrium (which would not be the case in a "closed" system). In essence, an open-system approach allows for a series of never-ending and conflicting demands (in the form of statements/actions) made by public policy makers or interested others. According to Ripley (1972, P. 11), "The analytical emphasis in examining such a system should be on the 'adaptive action' of the system rather than on the 'accumulations of power' by given actors seeking goals within a closed system capable of attaining a 'fine equilibrium.'" Both the conditions in and around the system and the goals of the various participants change over time; however, the essential relationships between the competing actors in the policy-making process remain discernable.

Moreover, an open-system model provides insight into the policy-making process at a particular point in time that reflects current or relevant environmental factors. Ripley points out that "environment" has always been a troublesome concept for those desiring

to use system analysis and that the argument is made that we must "differentiate the system from the environment." Such an argument assumes that the environment is outside the policy system. However, by considering the system open, "we eliminate the necessity of drawing precise boundaries between system and environment" (1972, P. 11).

For our research purposes, the policy system consists of four elements: policy-relevant environmental factors, policy statements, policy actions, and policy outcome variables. In addition, policy statements and policy action variables are part of a public policy process. Figure 2 represents this policy system. The diagram underscores the reality that policy making is an ongoing process, a series of adjustments and adaptations that are multi-directional with respect to possible relationships emerging.

Figure 2

Possible Relationships Among Policy-Related Variable Clusters



CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS

Policy Statements

For our purposes, policy statements are statements from policy makers, in their official roles, in reference to the process of implementing the Adams criteria. More specifically, this study is concerned with those declarations from policy makers that are clues to the actors' familiarity with the policy and that serve as a gauge to measure the consistency between their attitudes and behaviors in relation to implementing the Adams criteria. Policy makers vary considerably in their knowledge and interpretation of and commitment to a policy (Ripley, 1972, p. 8), a diversity reflected in the statements of principle characters.

This section includes responses by significant others that are intended to serve as "debunking" statements in the face of official policy statements. A guiding assumption throughout this study is that discrepancies exist between what official policy makers say they intend to do and what they actually do.

The core of this analysis is assessing the perceptions or opinions of official policy makers as determinants of policy actions and policy outcome. Public policy literature assumes that successful/unsuccessful implementation of public policy is based on the will, commitment or opinion of administrators responsible for the implementation.

Before analyzing particular policy statements, discussing the problematic features of the Adams criteria is necessary. First, the policy, although federally mandated, is state designed. Each Adams state was ordered to devise and implement a desegregation plan. Since these states vary in terms of traditions, political structure, population size and so forth, HEW was compelled to establish broad and somewhat ambiguous guidelines; thus, each state exercises a tremendous amount of discretion concerning the criteria. One drawback of this state autonomy is the lack of a uniform, official policy. In addition, since implementing the guidelines in any state involves addressing numerous distinct issues, isolating a single overall policy is difficult. There are many policies, interstate and intrastate, and the problem is complicated by the multiplicity of policy statements. Our policy statement analysis centers on diverse and conflicting interpretations of the implementation process.

Theoretically, the most salient factor involved in policy statements is knowledge of policy. Suggesting that policy statements by policy makers well-versed in the literature are substantively different from the declarations of their less-knowledgeable counterparts is not a moot point. The most blatant examples involve the specificity of policy statements. Well-versed policy makers speak authoritatively about the specifics of a decree, whereas other policy makers mask their ignorance with general statements, as illustrated by the following excerpts from the interviews.

A TWI affirmative action official remarked:

> I'm afraid I'm not aware of the legal background of the Adams plan. I really haven't heard of Adams at all. Of course, my office is active with recruiting minorities, mostly students. That kind of stuff [the Plan] is handled by Dr. ____'s office . . . . Is Adams related to the civil rights bill? If so, I think it's a good idea.

A state-level education official stated:

> My office does not have jurisdiction in this case. Mrs. ____ and Dr. ____ mentioned it to me but that was last week; before then I was unaware of it. No one has suggested that I take an active role . . . . If I become involved, of course, I would have to get acquainted with it . . . . We are all committed to desegregation here.

A minorities studies official at one TWI asserted:

> I am only vaguely aware of the Adams decree. Since I assume that it is connected with Title VI, I believe it compels a number of universities to increase their intake of black students and also faculty. I see it as part of the affirmative action program. I lack details about the specifics. I am aware that this university along with others have been identified as deficient, derelict in their duty of incorporating minority students. Consequently, quite a number of things have been articulated as to what they are doing, how short they are falling, the efforts they are making, and how ineffective they have been. So I am vaguely aware of what the implications are but I am not terribly familiar with the specifics and details.

Regarding the respondents' knowledge of the Adams criteria, several points are noteworthy. First, as these remarks demonstrate, some participants in the policy process were almost totally ignorant of the guidelines' general thrust and/or background. Given the guidelines' controversial nature and their potential implications, this situation is puzzling. On several other occasions, respondents were asked to explain the relationship between the Adams criteria and affirmative action programs. One interviewee asked, "Is Adams new, or does it tie in with quotas?"

At first glance, the assumption that these respondents have some knowledge of Adams but use different terminology seems plausible. However, this assumption does not explain the pervasive ignorance about the state plans. Even among respondents with a general knowledge of the criteria, finding that they knew little about the specific objectives and strategies of their state plans was common.

A trustee board staff member at a TWI remarked:

> My understanding of the plan is that it is intended to bring more minority faculty and students to this university, and if we are not doing what they [OCR] wants us to do, then there will be penalties . . . . No, I do not know what the penalties will be. I rely on the affirmative action office to explain the Adams plan to me. We have not discussed penalties nor the specific objectives that you mentioned earlier.

A state politician responded:

> I understand that we were directed to comply with certain OCR directives. That we were instructed to bring in more blacks and other racial minorities into TWIs. I understand that the respective universities have certain things in place to aid in the Adams Plan implementation . . . . No, off-hand, I cannot spell-out these programs.

One possible explanation for lack of knowledge about the specific objectives of the Adams criteria involves the respondents' "level of responsibility." Respondents whose professional roles necessitated involvement with an Adams plan were the most knowledgeable group; respondents whose professional roles did not include reviewing, critiquing, or publicizing a plan often bordered on total ignorance of it.

This disparity in familiarity with the criteria was exacerbated by the absence of regular forums, seminars, workshops, and public meetings.

Information about a plan was not distributed throughout the planning process; often, only those who wrote it knew its details.

The minorities studies official quoted earlier explained:

> We do not have seminars to discuss the decree. I fault the affirmative action office because all too often it is assumed that we know these things. If I don't know enough about the specifics, my white colleagues probably know even less. What we need is to have the affirmative action office acquaint the people, especially the department chairs, about the specifics of the decree and the whole affirmative action program. People talk in generalities about the need to do something, but we don't know what is actually needed.

A TBI administrator, who is well-versed in the Adams case, remarked:

> We don't have forums; some people don't even know what's going on. I tried to get a copy of the state plan from ____, [a high-ranking state official] but I couldn't reach her. I could have gotten it from a white person. These positions [affirmative action posts] were created as part of a show--to show that you're complying with OCR. They don't have a great deal of authority. There are not forums with representatives from the commissioners' office. It is not enough just to write a plan but to plan, for operationalizing. It's a wonder that any non-state official knows anything about the plan.

It should be mentioned that the respondents in this study were selected initially because of their potential participation in the policy process. We were shocked to find that most of them knew little about the specific objectives and formal strategies of their state plans, while others, albeit a minority, were almost totally ignorant of the Adams guidelines. Because other explanations for this situation are linked to particular declarations by policy makers, the following discussion analyzes several policy statements.

The most consistent statement from high-ranking state officials dealt with "good-faith" efforts and can be summarized thusly:

"our desegregation efforts predate Adams, and our present commitment to equality in higher education is evidence of good faith on our part." The following excerpts from the interviews reflect this generalization.

A policy analyst in a governor's office stated:

> Also, you have to recognize "reasonable efforts," that is, we should be judged on the basis of our efforts; it is at this time physically impossible to fulfill the mandate of the Adams plan. OCR understands that Florida has put forth the effort. It is the process that is important, or the means to the ends. Therefore, we are seriously concentrating on the process and the means to an end, but the ends cannot be reached at this time.

One of the writers of Florida's first Adams plan recounted:

> We didn't reach our original goals because they were unrealistic. No one knew what we should do, HEW didn't know. ____ [the HEW representative] was very vague, gave us the impression that he wanted only "good faith." We tried many things but they always wanted more. We have given good-faith efforts from the beginning.

A TWI affirmative action director, asked to comment on a newspaper editorial in which the state's education commissioner stated that the Adams criteria would be almost impossible to implement, remarked:

> I don't dare interpret the commissioner's position, if that's what you're trying to make me do, other than he perceives that Florida has shown progress and has demonstrated good-faith effort so that if there was a suit we would counter.

Interestingly, later in the interview, when asked to discuss the negative sanctions that might be employed by the Board of Regents if the TWIs did not exhibit good-faith effort, this respondent replied, "Good faith is a federal term, as such; it does not affect my office."

A member of Oklahoma's Coordinating Board stated:

> Our commitment to good-faith initiatives is reflected in the development of the concept, Social Justice. This document [entitled Social Justice] is more than a philosophical statement. It is the official position of the Regents on the question of equality for all our citizens. Oklahoma, because of its Indian background, with councils, open participation, and so on has always supported justice initiatives. Other states may claim to show good faith but we have gone a step further. Our good faith is being written and acted on.

Although it is true that the federal government initially introduced the term "good faith" into Adams planning, it is now a central feature of many policy statements emanating from policy makers in both Oklahoma and Florida. We should mention, however, that some respondents, especially those not officially charged with developing a plan at the state level, challenged the veracity of good-faith declarations.

A faculty member in the social sciences at a TWI stated:

> One of the reasons for our modest success is because of people outside of the official decision makers. They have brought us kicking and screaming into the desegregation era. The actions of this institution are motivated by a desire not to be embarrassed, not noble intentions on the part of policy leaders.

The TBI administrator cited earlier remarked:

> The Board of Regents and other state officials do what they are forced to do. Good-faith efforts are a sad joke. They put down things on paper that cannot work. Then, when these goals are not reached, they claim that their good-faith efforts should be rewarded since they tried to obtain these unrealistic goals. What they don't tell you is that the unrealistic goals were their doing, not HEW's.

A TBI administrator expressed similar sentiments:

> The new mission of this institution was an attempt by the Board [Board of Regents] to give us something that we couldn't do. They tried to box us in with this urban mission but it's obvious what they wanted. They wanted us to fail so that the talk of making this a prison would start again.

Closely related to good-faith policy statements (and subsequent debates) are policy statements that emphasize a state's past accomplishments as a means of fending off present criticisms. Such statements may be summarized as follows: "The criticism directed toward us is unfair; we have always been at the forefront of desegregation efforts, and we plan to continue our excellence in this important area."

The interviews suggest that high-ranking officials, especially those with responsibility for implementing the Adams criteria, often voice, with little variation, a similar statement. For instance, a TWI affirmative action director remarked:

> This was the first school in the state university system to appoint a full-time person at the administrative level to address affirmative action. FSU [Florida State University] was the first to develop a model plan to be given to the Board of Regents to give to other schools. FSU's affirmative action plan was one of the first in the nation to be approved by OCR in 1973. Our past president and current president were concerned that we take the lead. We've had commitment from the top. Whether you accept this or not is your problem, but we have given attention to the spirit of the law and gone beyond the mandate. Those who criticize don't know the facts.

A Board of Trustees staff member presents a similar picture of Oklahoma: more specifically, of the role of Oklahoma University in the affirmative-action process:

> Well, I have lived in Oklahoma all of my life and Oklahoma is not a southern state similar to North Carolina, Georgia, or Alabama. OU went out on the limb during the 1940s and encouraged Ada Louise Sipuel to apply here in spite of the state law that prohibited the integration of the schools. OU and their board of trustees at that time went out on a limb. Under the leadership of President Cross, OU was the only institution willing to challenge the Jim Crow laws. President Cross actually encouraged Sipuel to apply for admission. Also, you should know that as far back as 1968, , who is now in the regents office, served as assistant for minority affairs, which was the functional equivalent of the affirmative action officer. If you are suggesting that we have a history of opposing desegregation then these facts should suffice. We have a ways to go, but the ground was broken in the 1940s.

If one compares present-day Oklahoma and Florida with the 1940 versions of these two states, many changes have taken place in regard to desegregating higher education. Indeed, the nation as a whole has undergone social change. Setting aside the historical "facts" in the last two interviews, our data, both historical and current, cast doubt on the assertion that Oklahoma and Florida policy makers have voluntarily complied with government directives to desegregate their institutions of higher education. From Brown to Adams, desegregation measures have been viewed generally as a nuisance or as a threat to the prevailing social order.

A TBI administrator stated:

> Florida is one of three states that for three years didn't do a thing. After getting a court order they did nothing. In 1973, the court demanded that HEW obtain compliance from these states. This is the first indication to me that these states didn't really want to comply. . . . State leaders aren't interested in Adams. They don't regard desegregation in Florida at any level as particularly important. I've talked to people from the regents to the legislature, and they either don't know about Adams or don't give a damn.

An officer in an Oklahoma civic organization that monitors the Adams case stated:

> Enough of the political rhetoric. Oklahoma has a history of lying, racist politicians. They [OU] never welcomed Mrs. Sipuel-Fisher. She was mistreated in the courts, in the papers, and I imagine in practically every white home. This state opposed integration in schools and colleges. Until a few years ago, all state officials were white. Even now its top heavy with whites. If anything, state officials have not been criticized enough. I cringe every time one gets up boasting about their integration accomplishments and plans; both are lies.

Policy statements stressing factors that hinder Adams criteria implementation are numerous in Oklahoma and Florida. They usually involve two assertions: 1) the low number of qualified blacks and 2) insufficient resources to compete with richer eastern schools. The following excerpts illustrate these two points.

A TWI board of trustees staff member claimed:

> I think we are making progress but we are probably not doing as much as we should. We are limited by what we can do because of finances. We need more money for scholarships. I know that at our medical school, we have admitted well-qualified black students and then they were offered better scholarships elsewhere. I believe that the regents have a minority financial aid plan, but I think that we need more funding. We do have fee waiver scholarships on campus. Sometimes I believe that we have so many of the scholarships going to minorities that we don't have money left for white students . . . . We are providing financial aid to many questionable [sic] qualified black students at the expense of many deserving white students.

An Oklahoma policy analyst stated:

> You must understand that there are regions of Oklahoma where blacks literally don't exist. Even if there were many qualified blacks in the state, how could we get them there. The panhandle is a regional problem. There are few blacks in the area, and it is difficult to recruit blacks because of social implications.

A state-level researcher in Florida volunteered these comments:

> We are doing everything possible to find qualified black faculty. They just aren't there. We are building a vita bank in the hope of isolating them. How can we tap a market that doesn't exist? We are faced with the prospect of buying them from other schools or not fulfilling the mandate.

A TWI vice president stated:

> We produce a semester-by-semester report of individual colleges regarding black graduate students and faculty. Two weeks ago we enhanced our percentage of black faculty in arts and sciences by 25% because we hired our fifth black faculty, a Ph.D. in meteorology. I didn't know there were black Ph.D.'s in meteorology, but there was and we got him. This is only one case of our efforts panning out. We are competing better with the more established schools.

Similar claims have been used to rationalize excluding minorities and women from the mainstream of American society. As with the policy statements that stressed good-faith efforts, declarations from policy makers that emphasize financial problems and the paucity of qualified blacks draw sharp criticism.

For instance, a TWI director of minority programs stated:

> They keep complaining about low numbers. I heard it said that not enough black folks in Oklahoma get Ph.D.s. We are down in Oklahoma and black folks don't want to come here. Well, these are all excuses. If you sweeten the pot, black faculty and students will come here. I'm tired of this talk about not enough qualified blacks.

The faculty member cited earlier remarked:

> We have a revolving door. That is the other side of it. In the 17 years that I have been here, we have had at least 20-25 bright, talented black faculty members who are no longer here. The issue until recent times has not been recruitment, it has been retention. The departments will bring them in and they don't fit. That means they are not playing

> basketball, they are not going to the department picnics and out to eat lunch, so they don't fit. A black scholar has to do more than his or her job, or they get terminated. At present, we have only four black professors on campus.

A civil rights activist interviewed as a significant other asserted:

> First, the board says we don't have money to hire black faculty. Then when a black faculty applies for a job vacated by a white, you've got problems. Dr. _____ applied for a job at OU but they wouldn't give him an interview. This guy was a real Ivy Leaguer, credentials were great, but he couldn't get an interview. They made tons of excuses. We had a telephone and letter campaign and met with top administrators. All of this to get him an interview. He got tired of them and took a job in the East. Anybody who thinks that racism is gone hasn't been in Oklahoma lately. Now, they're complaining, again, that they can't find blacks.

A final policy statement to be considered in this section involves the legal relationship between a state and the Adams criteria; it may be summarized as follows: "It should be understood that this state is not being sued for noncompliance; HEW is being sued. Since our desegregation efforts are not in response to a federal suit, we should be judged accordingly." (It is interesting to note in connection with these legalities that, in the interviews, the Department of Education [DE] was consistently referred to as HEW.)

An official in the chancellor's office responded to a query concerning statements the commissioner made regarding the non-feasibility of the Adams criteria:

> You will probably hear a lot of things said around here. The commissioner was stating, I believe, that when the goals were negotiated, that the goals could not be reached by 1982, but that we can only put forth a good-faith effort. He also

> noted that Florida was not under a court order but was implementing the court order on the basis of voluntary compliance. We should make the best effort possible to obtain these goals.

An Oklahoma Board of Regents staff worker stated:

> Do you realize that Oklahoma is not being sued? No suit has been filed against us. Your questions should be directed toward Mississippi and Louisiana officials. When we spend tons of money searching for black students, faculty, professors, and classified workers, it's because it's the right and appropriate action.

A TBI administrator offered a different viewpoint:

> Sure, we're not being sued, but is that a justification for nonaction? I have little confidence in federal agencies to bring suit against Florida. Whenever we push for some action everybody yells "we're not being sued, we're not being sued."

A commissioner's office worker candidly reported:

> The commissioner knows we're not under suit. It affects his actions. When you're under suit you react in a different way. I think the commissioner's office is sincere about Adams but a court order is not a legal suit. We're not under suit and everybody knows it. If we were sued--I really shouldn't say this--the commissioner would do more.

Policy Actions

Policy actions are the behaviors policy makers exhibit in response and in relation to the policy process. In other words, policy actions are what the various government units do in the policy process. In this study, all behavior by policy makers that facilitates or hinders implementing the Adams criteria is conceptualized as policy actions. This section is organized around several policy actions as discerned from the interviews.

According to Prestage (1982, p.74), the broad objectives of the Adams criteria are the following:

1) disestablishing the structure of the racially-dual system of higher education;

2) desegregating student enrollment;

3) desegregating faculty, administration, staff and governance; and,

4) enhancing traditionally black institutions.

The action of policy makers in response to these objectives will be analyzed under the topics "monitoring procedures" and "policy initiatives," with extensive excerpts from interviews to clarify the wide range of discrepancies that exist in implementing and interpreting implementation of the criteria.

Monitoring Procedures

Because all the Adams states, at least initially, were slow to implement the guidelines, monitoring procedures quickly assumed paramount importance. Theoretically, each government unit was to be monitored to determine its actions in regard to the four objectives listed above.

The bulk of the responsibility for monitoring Adams criteria implementation lies with the Department of Education (formerly HEW). In fact, the Adams criteria were initiated because HEW failed to obtain acceptable plans from states with racially-dual systems of higher education. Explicit in Adams is the need for DE to monitor the implementation process. Data collected from these interviews suggest that various policy makers have different perceptions of DE's inclination and ability to monitor the states' implementation of the criteria. This view is reflected by one of the writers of Florida's original state plan:

> HEW didn't know what they wanted. First they wanted only good-faith efforts, then specific numerical goals, then special programs. Each time we gave them what they asked for. When they came and asked for numerical goals, we gave them that and more. We even sat down and showed them [HEW] what to do. Unfortunately, once we show them a program, they act as if it's their initiative and start demanding that we comply.

A chancellor's staff member stated:

> Our actions aren't altered by their [HEW] arrival. We were desegregating this system before Adams. We have a better record of reaching our goals than other states but our goals are higher. When they [HEW] come here from Dallas, they recognize this. We have achieved greater parity than the other states although they claim to reach their goals. Do you know why? Because HEW allowed them lower goals. This is unfair. Only Florida has goals as high as we. They [HEW] are only concerned with stats. Little attention is devoted to our successful reduction of disparity between blacks and whites.

A minority studies official offered these views:

> Every time one of those people come in from Dallas, the people who are dealing with the court case, they will come in and we will talk. I think they are concerned with undergrads. They line out how many students you are supposed to have among the first-time entering freshmen. They said that we are doing excellent work but more is needed. I nod politely, since they don't come too often.

A TBI administrator responded:

> I didn't know HEW did any monitoring. I haven't seen them here. Supposedly, they were here a few months back, but I didn't get an opportunity to engage them. I have recommended to the president that he publicize their visits for interested parties. When I do see them I have a lot to discuss.

We should mention that, although DE is officially charged with enforcing the Adams criteria, OCR, a sub-unit within DE, is the primary monitoring body. Interestingly, most of the respondents, when discussing federal monitoring, referred to HEW, not OCR, despite their

interaction with OCR representatives. The actual criteria for monitoring any stage in the process, though, must be formulated by individual states. The formal organizational arrangements in Florida and Oklahoma offer a framework for analyzing intrastate monitoring procedures.

Under Florida's state constitution, the governor shares authority with a collegial body, the state cabinet, which is comprised of six elected state officials. In education, the chief policy-making body is the State Board of Education, consisting of the governor and the cabinet. Florida's cabinet system gives the governor one vote on the seven-member State Board of Education, which the governor chairs. Other members of the State Board of Education serve only because they were elected to some other state office. The commissioner of education, who is elected statewide, has one vote on the State Board of Education and is a member of the governor's cabinet.

The Florida Board of Regents has 13 members, including a student regent and the commissioner of education. The term of appointment is six years. The Board of Regents, appointed by the governor, is the chief policy-making body for state universities. However, the Regents' rule-making authority is subject to review by the Board of Education. The legislature itself also sets education-related policy on occasion (Chandler, 1984, Pp. 9, 106).

State structures for governing and coordinating higher education vary. Oklahoma, for instance, has a dual or two-tiered system, with governing boards for each institution and a state coordinating board (the State Regents for Higher Education). In essence, it is a

decentralized system of governance. Florida's Board of Regents, on the other hand, is a consolidated governing board: a single board that both governs and coordinates all state public institutions of higher education, except community colleges. Boards structured in this manner are regarded as strong and highly centralized. Consequently, Florida's Board of Education and Board of Regents have been able to function under a broad legislative grant of authority to manage, oversee, and control the universities in the State University System (SUS) and to delegate to the university presidents the authority for day-to-day institutional management (Chandler, 1983, Pp. 42-45).

Since 1979, however, the Florida legislature has reduced the Regents' general broad authority, especially over universities, by limiting the Regents' specific powers to 1) appointing university and college presidents and the chancellor, 2) approving and terminating new degree programs, and 3) recommending fees and adopting a system-wide master plan. In addition, the Regents are instructed to review only their own legislative budget requests. Many of the Regents' powers, such as appointing and removing key university personnel, were transferred to the presidents (Chandler, 1983, P. 45).

The above data on organizational arrangements provided a context to evaluate the "subjective" data obtained through the interviews. We were particularly interested in the policy makers' perceptions of monitoring procedures in relation to organizational arrangements at the state level.

While discussing the controversy surrounding Oklahoma's Langston University, a former Board of Regents member made the following

statement. We cite it in detail here to help illustrate a dilemma in the policy process that in some cases prevents successful desegregation efforts:

> When Adams was ordered, Oklahoma was not prepared and they did not intend to follow it. But the governor said we were going to follow it and then the chancellor decided to go along. They thought the way to implement Adams was to close Langston. The A & M board, Langston's governing board, said they would not have summer school, sometime after 1974. I felt this was the first step in trying to close Langston. In talking with the chancellor I found that the regents were in battle with OSU regents, I don't know why, if it was because of implementing Adams or what. Just from the implications and overhearing discussions, I gathered that Adams was part of it.
>
> The reason for closing Langston was that some of the books were messed up and the only way to fix them was to close down. I received a call from the A & M board saying they were going to close Langston, but they wanted to talk to me first. The vote had already been made. I asked to speak to who said that I was to get the books straight. I told him I didn't think it could be done. The chairman came to the phone and said if any changes were going to be made it would have to be done in a morning session. They called the alumni association and issued a news release the next morning saying the alumni opposed the closing. I called the chancellor but he was out of town. When I finally spoke with him he said he was glad they [Alumni] opposed because the money had already been appropriated and they [A & M Board] did not have the authority to close Langston, only the higher education Board of Regents could do so. There was a battle, some people on the regents board were close to OSU; they had to get a ruling from the attorny general. There was a meeting between members of OSU board and the executive director. He said in my presence that he could force us to keep Langston open but he could see that we only had a dozen students! He asked if I knew that most of the students owed money to the school. Then, he said the A & M board had ruled that no student would be admitted until they had paid the money they owed. My family and a group raised $8,500 to pay the students' bills. Then the A & M board said they didn't have enough staff to process registration. The regents sent staff to the school. The alumni

> association had a CPA there to help with enrollment and give them money to pay off their bills. That summer Langston had one of the largest enrollments in history.

This lengthy excerpt represents a policy action in its social context. The interview shows the perceptions of a policy maker (a board of regents member) toward an attempt by members of the upper echelons of Oklahoma's educational establishment to implement the Adams guidelines, albeit by closing Langston University. It further shows the contradiction between legal proclamations and actions that work in opposition to them in order to avoid changes in societal traditions. The camouflage of good-faith efforts is exposed in the examination of political manuevers, which indicate the rigidity of social barriers on institutions such as segregation and racism.

An assistant to Florida's chancellor, in response to a question regarding board of regents authority to enforce the Adams criteria, stated:

> The board through the chancellor will look to the university presidents to carry out the plans. Since 1982, the board has been receiving annual reports on, for example, the employment of blacks in the State University System. Since 1982, the reports have primarily concentrated on recruitment and retention of black employees. In the case of black employees, the board noted that there had been only little or no increase. The planning committee on the board turned to the respective universities and asked what had they been doing to comply with affirmative action mandates and is affirmative action a part of their manager's evaluation criteria. At one time it was not, but it is now, and when the chancellor conducts an annual evaluation of the university presidents, she contacts our office for input. As a result of this type of scrutiny, some university presidents, for example, at the University of North Florida, laid down guidelines so as how to monitor affirmative action compliance. When the deans at the University of North Florida reported that there were

> no qualified black applicants in the availability pool, the vice-president's office requested the list of applicants from the deans and found and hired two qualified black faculty. Therefore, we do have some positive results in response to the Adams plan as a result of intervention and initiative on the part of some university presidents. Also, the university presidents council was asked by the chancellor to develop a comprehensive plan to effectively address affirmative action mandates in higher education. The wishes of the regents are communicated to the university presidents through this council.

A state-level policy analyst, responding to a question about recent policy statements from the commissioner suggesting that the Adams guidelines were not feasible, explained:

> You have to understand that the state board of education under the commissioner is not a change agent but status-quo oriented. However, the board of education under Governor Bob Graham has become more of a policy agency and the commissioner has receded in importance. Graham has become more of a de facto commissioner of education. For example, the Governor has put money for counseling and scholarships in community colleges for minorities. This type of an initiative is linked to the budget, which makes budget questions a substantive issue. The board of education's budget is incremental at best but the Governor usually adds an amendment to include, for example, certain items. The budget and planning office used to be in the Department of Administration [DOA]. Governor Graham took the budget and planning office out of DOA and put them in his office. Therefore, the Governor's budget is consistent with the budget and planning office budget. Also, the Governor has a veto line on all budget items. If there is a weak link in the Adams implementation chain, they must be cautious, because the Governor holds the purse strings.

These last three remarks suggest several points. First, there appears to be some disparity between the official roles and the actual responsibilities of some policy makers. The Governor, as "de facto" commissioner of education, exemplifies this phenomenon. Second,

conflicts of interest and diverse motivations were observed among policy makers, as typified by the events surrounding the proposal to close Langston University. Finally, although Florida's formal education hierarchy is more complex than Oklahoma's, both systems are sophisticated and are difficult to understand because of informal networks and norms. The remaining comments are from policy makers regarding the enforcement techniques of the boards of regents, which are the bodies officially charged by the governors to implement the Adams criteria

A staff member in a commissioner's office responded:

> Well, this is the way we are approaching this problem. Dr. _____ can discuss this further with you. The Regents EEOC Advisory Committee asked the same question. Their [Chancellors] responses ranged from denying merit increases for a particular faculty to not renewing contracts. These sanctions were applied at the University of North Florida. We had reports of racist acts from an official in the bursar's office. We investigated and found that the allegations were true so the woman was fired. These sanctions vary from university to university. If you have applications from qualified blacks, give them to us and we will give them to the universities.

A state financial official replied:

> We've had no major problems getting our schools to comply with directives. Early on, one or two schools were a bit slow so the chancellor called them and said, "Listen, you guys are dragging on this thing. There will be consequences for noncompliance." . . . We [chancellor's office] control funding, universities submit their budgets and we have discretion to play with certain items before submitting the total package to the legislature.

A TWI board of trustees staff member stated:

> The Regents enforce compliance by subtly threatening to withhold monies. Of course, this is never stated but understood. A lot of emphasis is placed on the scrutiny of our reports. HEW can penalize the politicians, who debate the Regents and of course we answer to them.

Policy Initiatives

Since the goal of the Adams criteria is to change the structure of institutions of higher education, it is important to discuss those actions initiated by policy makers that facilitate the implementation process. One general type of policy action uncovered by the interviews is the formation of committees. For instance, a former TWI EEOC officer stated:

> This past January [1984], the state board of education created an advisory committee to advise the board on problems faced by blacks. No, I should say the board approved the creation of this committee. We have money for staff and travel. The president here heads this committee. It's a fact-finding committee that makes recommendations to the regents. We have conferences throughout the state. Last May we were in Tallahassee. I think we do an important service.

A TBI administrator offered a different assessment of this committee:

> This advisory committee is a non-critical committee. The membership is almost all black but these upper-middle-class blacks are more concerned with traveling around the state than pressuring state officials to implement Adams. They have yet to produce a critical agenda. If you read the proceedings report, you will see my feelings are true. They go through the motions.

A current member of the Oklahoma EEOC committee, created by the Board of Regents, stated:

> My biggest complaint is that my committee is an advisory committee, not a policy committee. We went to the chancellor and complained that we were always contacted after the fact. We wanted to be in on policy formulation but the chancellor said, "you are my committee, created at my pleasure." We have argued adamantly, but the chancellor intends to keep us in our place.

Another type of committee is the newly-created affirmative action committees at most universities. They are under the purview of affirmative action directors. Interestingly, these persons tend to be minorities, especially blacks. A current member of a TWI affirmative action advisory committee stated:

> We advise the president via affirmative action personnel. Our goal is to sensitize university personnel to an objective view of their affirmative action successes or failures. We meet regularly. The committee is composed of mostly community and civic leaders. All persons have the floor and the meeting are productive.

Another member of that committee offered a different opinion:

> The last meeting was my last. I think they're for show, a pretense that affirmative action is being done. It's no more than a rubber stamp for the university's lack of commitment to affirmative action. They bring us in as "university antagonists" and give us a little information and then say they've done a deed. The affirmative action officer dominates the meetings and refuses to accept opposing views. is a pawn for hire. Anyone on the committee with a conscience knows our work is fixed.

Similar sentiments were expressed by a member of a comparable committee in Oklahoma:

> On the one hand, there are the positives. We have access to university affirmative action persons. But I wonder if we really effect any changes. I must be honest now, the affirmative action representative is a mirror of the university. He, I believe strongly, is a good man but not very critical of affirmative action failures. It is a forum for discussion of great issues, but I'm not certain we effect changes and improvements in affirmative action programs. The committee has potential but at present we aren't addressing some basic issues.

In addition to committees appointed by boards of regents and those created by individual institutions, legislators also have initiated committees to address the affirmative action question.

A Florida policy analyst stated:

> Last year [1983] the house and senate established an education planning commission. I'm not sure if this body is in response to the Adams decision. The objectives, broadly, are to study and make proposals of higher education.

An Oklahoma State Representative responded:

> We have created a special committee on affirmative action during the current legislative interim. We desire to review the status of progress made by minorities in our public institutions. The committee consists of legislators and citizens. Most of these citizens are educators. I am the chairman. We have planned a series of meetings to educate House members and concerned members about the status of blacks in Oklahoma. Our purpose is to address and publicize the status of blacks.

Under the Adams criteria, the most important policy action involves creating and implementing affirmative action programs. In spite of the polemics, the salient issue is whether or not programs are initiated that facilitate Adams criteria implementation.

A staff worker for a state representative addressed this issue:

> We feel that the universities must recruit black Ph.D.s who are academically prepared to handle graduate level work. There are new educational programs in the system that have been put in place to prepare minority students for graduate and undergraduate education. They are college prep work and entrance level testing. We felt that the college prep program should be based at community colleges so that universities would be able to contract with the community colleges to fulfill their student tutorial obligations.

A TWI administrator stated:

> We have several programs. ____ administers our GPOP programs, this has produced several black Ph.D.s. University fellowship office sets aside five or six for minorities only. Typically these will be black. We have our college teaching fellows program given to each college and we encourage minorities to apply. We have a brand new program for fall of 1984: $60,000 is set aside by our vice-president. Arts and Sciences have received two scholarships-not programs-individual awards.

An assistant to a chancellor also commented on the programs that help facilitate the criteria:

> Well, one is called the Special Summer Program. It is used to bring blacks to campus who have already been accepted in the State University System in order to orient them to the respective campus and graduate program.
>
> The orientation involves taking one or two courses, for credit, during the summer with close faculty monitoring as well as special seminars on study skills. We also have the grant-in-aid which can be used by both blacks and women, graduate and undergraduate students. This grant is primarily used for upgrading existing employees. All of the above money comes from the regents office.

A high-ranking state official stated:

> This information is in the annual reports. More detailed information will be in the respective university reports. The SGI was funded for about 20 students on an annual basis, so we are talking about approximately $100,000. This last year we asked the budget office as part of our increased commitment to OCR to increase funding for this program and we went from awarding 23 awards in 1983-1984 to a future commitment of 62 awards. However, not all of the awards were full-year awards based on the particular student's own program, and we increased the money award from $4,500 to $5,000 per student.

In addition to the programs discussed above, which, coincidently, do not offer significant group relief, two programs were initiated: the Hawkins Scholarship and the McKnight Foundation Fellowship.

An assistant chancellor explained the Hawkins Scholarship:

> Last year, we established the Virgil Hawkins Scholarship Fund, which are $25,000 scholarships which are divided between the two major law schools and to be administered by the respective law schools. There is another $100,000 provided this year for new students. The scholarships are renewable as long as the students stay in good standing. We're proud of Hawkins.

A TBI department chairman presented a different picture:

> Virgil Hawkins is the black who tried to get into the University of Florida. He finally got his degree way up north and the Supreme Court made it possible for him to practice law in Florida without taking the Florida bar. This scholarship is named after him and goes to black law students at UF and FSU.
>
> There was a controversy around that at the last session. Hawkins was brought before the Florida bar on the grounds that he was incompetent. Apparently, during a case he made a mistake in advising his client, he was chastised, they may have suspended his license for a short time. Anyway there were some whites on the appropriation committee who felt you shouldn't name a grant after a person of that calibre.
>
> Sen. Carol Meeks gave them the history. When a lawyer said, "We wouldn't want Hawkins as a role model," Meeks said, "We'd be glad to have him as a role model because he waged a successful war against the system." He changed his mind; he didn't have the historical perspective.

The McKnight Foundation Fellowships have been a source of controversy, apparently stemming from the reluctance of state officials to appropriate matching funds. The controversy is spelled out in the following remarks. One policy analyst suggested:

> Well, the governor recommends more money than the legislature appropriates for higher education. In regard to the Adams plan, the governor feels that Florida will do its best to comply with the mandate of the Adams decision. For example, the governor wrote the law for the McKnight Foundation money given to the state of Florida to subsidize graduate education for blacks and women. However, the legislature passed legislation saying that the McKnight Foundation is a good idea, but they did not appropriate the necessary matching funds, which was a requirement of the McKnight Foundation. It is common in Florida to sign-off on a good piece of legislation without appropriating money for its implementation.
>
> Jack Gordon [Dade County], Florida Senate President [a state leader in the Better Schools Movement] felt that the money should be spent to support the south Florida area universities, so he blocked it. I don't think there are philosophical reasons for not appropriating the money.

A congressional committee staff director said:

> I don't think there was any real opposition to the McKnight Foundation by the appropriation committee. The appropriation committee just never got around to it. You have to understand that the McKnight Foundation proposal called for a five million dollar Florida commitment. The Florida legislature only "theoretically" committed $2-1/2 million over the next three years instead of the five million. Although no money was actually appropriated by the state legislature, the McKnight Foundation will allocate money to implement the program in the fall.

A TWI vice president further stated:

> The McKnight fellowships were a gift horse. William McKnight was a Floridian who supplied this windfall. Students can get $10,000 a year plus tuition and fees for three years. The State University System awarded 16 black fellowships this year and we are authorized to give up to 25 fellowships next year.

A TBI administrator also commented on the McKnight fellowships:

> The reluctance of the board to get behind the McKnight fund is a good example of their actions toward the Adams plan. Here, they received a large sum of money and only had to match the money, but they hedged. I tell you this state does not have a commitment to higher education. Sure, the governor claims we're committed to joining the top quarter of universities. I've been part of this system for more than thirty years. I've seen patterns. Higher education is not a priority and blacks are definitely not a priority. The people I've talked with are of the opinion that Adams is a waste of time, and I've talked to people at every level.

Policy Outcomes

Good-faith efforts permeate policy statements and policy actions throughout our study, at both the state and federal levels of government. In the real world, however, good-faith efforts may not be translated into real policy outcomes (Fleming, Gill & Swinton, 1978, P. 46).

In our policy system model, policy outcomes are the concrete extensions of policy statements and policy actions (Ripley, 1972, P. 6). Policy outcomes require evaluating policy actions to the same extent as intended policy statements. For our study, policy outcomes are identified and analyzed on the basis of consistency or inconsistency with the intended policy statements and policy actions of official policy makers and other related actors, i.e., significant others.

Categorically, policy outcomes encompass five possible types of government responses (Ripley, 1972, P. 6): 1) no response (failing to act constitutes a policy outcome); 2) a response of affirmation (maintaining present conditions and patterns); 3) a response of

adjustment (openly acknowledging existing conditions, patterns, and trends without attempting to change them); 4) a response of manipulation (trying to use conditions, patterns and trends in the environment to facilitate achieving specific goals); 5) and, finally, a response aimed at changing or altering the environment (attempting to redefine environment conditions as a basis for reformulating a specific policy response).

Data in the preceding section suggest that most policy statements, policy actions, and, consequently, policy outcomes conform to the "no response" type of government response. For example, a test of Florida's good-faith efforts is the fact that Florida allocated no matching funds to the McKnight Foundation proposal; and, as a TBI administrator noted, "'good-faith effort' is a cover orchestrated by OCR to give the state an out for doing nothing." Further verification of "no response" evolved as a result of our intensive interviews. As one respondent noted, Florida would probably never implement the Adams criteria unless it were under court order or were made to do so by DE (OCR). On this point, a high-ranking Oklahoma regents official observed:

> The states are allowed to negotiate their compliance plans for OCR. That is, they are allowed to set up their own goals and timetables. Non-compliance is only reached when the respective states put forth goals and timetables that are too ambitious. Under these directives from OCR, one state can maintain gross disparities between blacks and whites and still be in compliance with the implementation phase of the Adams decree because their negotiated goals may be low, while another state may be making significant gains towards the successful implementation of the Adams decree but may be found to be in non-compliance because their goals may be too ambitious or high. The way to get out of the non-compliance business is to lower your goals.

Our data are replete with examples demonstrating "no action" as a form of policy outcome in our case study states. The inclusion of significant others in our research model provided a rich data source from which to test this point. As previously stated, successfully implementing a court mandate or other compelling legal directives is based on the will and commitment of administrators responsible for the implementation. The Reagan administration's opposition to passage of the 1984 Civil Rights Act is further evidence supporting this contention, especially as reflected in the administration's appointment of persons with commitments/allegiances contrary to the laws and programs they were hired to uphold. For example, in April, 1981, Secretary of Education T. H. Bell wrote to Senator Paul Laxalt that "the federal courts may soon be after us for not enforcing civil-rights laws and regulations . . . . It seems that we have some laws we should not have, and my obligation to enforce them is against my own philosophy" (Taylor, 1984, P. 46). Until the critical analysis and political participation of significant and progressive others and civil rights' groups begin to affect federal government enforcement policies/procedures, gross disparities between blacks and whites most likely will persist.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

This study made use of the case study to explore the responses of two states, Florida and Oklahoma, to the student financial aid aspect of the *Adams* court order. We employed a policy system model to define the relevant variables: policy-relevant environmental factors, policy statements, policy action, and policy outcomes. Unstructured on-site interviews of policy makers were held in Tallahassee and Oklahoma City in order to learn their opinions and perceptions. Documents were analyzed to gather contextual information which we classified as political, demographic, economic, and educational. Although the manifest goal was to determine student financial aid initiatives, the latent goals were to analyze this response in the broader context of each state's history, organizational characteristics, and structure.

Conclusions

Responses to a state's *Adams* plan in the form of policy statements reflect a policy maker's perceptions, opinions, or beliefs about a particular policy question. The responses of policy makers vary across a wide range of variables and attributes, which we described in Table 24.

Their level of knowledge we categorize as highly aware or little or no knowledge of the specifics of the state plan. Their responses we classify as dwelling on good-faith efforts in response to the state plan, dwelling on past accomplishments prior to the state plan, rationalizing the exclusion of blacks in response to the state plan, and dwelling on the legal relationship of the state plan to the Adams criteria.

The response patterns arrayed in Table 24 reflect the non-standardized approach this study used. They show how the interviewees actually responded and thus do not necessarily reflect a listing of comparable positive/negative statements in response to the state plan. Table 24 reflects how the respondents' knowledge of the state plan and response to the state plan varied by their level of responsibility.

Successfully implementing any policy question requires that policy makers display a high level of awareness of knowledge about the policy. We were particularly concerned with those declarations from policy makers that were clues to the actors' familiarity with the policy and that might serve to measure the consistency between their attitudes about and behaviors toward implementing the Adams criteria. Policy makers vary considerably in their knowledge and interpretation of and their commitment to a policy (Ripley, 1972, P. 8), a diversity that was documented in and analyzed from their policy statements or responses. We found that too few persons with high levels of responsibility for implementing their state plan could articulate the plan's specifics, although responses by state officials well versed in the literature of the Adams criteria were substantively different from the declarations of

the less knowledgeable. State-level respondents who were most responsible for their state plan were the most knowledgeable. On the other hand, those persons charged with the day-to-day operation of their state's university system of higher education (intermediary-level offices) knew the least about the specifics of their state plan when compared with respondents at both the university and significant other levels. Interviewee responses ranged from highly aware of the specifics of their state plan, to generally aware of the specifics, to ignorant of the specifics.

As previously argued, successfully implementing a court mandate or other compelling legal directive depends on the will and commitment of policy makers responsible for the implementation. The commitment (or non-commitment) of policy makers to a policy directive was manifest by the number of persons articulating good-faith efforts and past accomplishments in response to their state plan.

These responses are at least one step removed from policy actions that comply with Adams criteria directives. In the case of good-faith responses, one university-level respondent noted, "'good-faith effort' is a cover orchestrated by OCR to give the state an out for doing nothing." In addition, in reference to past-accomplishment responses, the data, both historical and current, cast doubt on the assertion that Oklahoma and Florida policy makers voluntarily complied with OCR directives to desegregate their institutions of higher education prior to the Adams criteria. More specifically, the data revealed that a majority of state-level and intermediary-level respondents offered both good-faith efforts and past-accomplishment responses in referring to their state plan. Responses offered at the university level were mixed,

while respondents at the significant other level consistently rejected both response patterns. The same response pattern (see Table 24) characterized efforts to rationalize the exclusion of minorities from graduate education and to justify the state's legal relationship to the Adams criteria (stressing that the state is not under a court order and that it has complied and will continue to comply with the Adams criteria without being under a court order (i.e., past accomplishments).

Moving from the highest level of responsibility to the lowest level, we found intermediary-level responses consistent with state-level responses, with the exception of knowledge of state plan specifics. However, university-level responses were mixed and consequently were not consistent with state-level and intermediary-level responses (with the exception of knowledge of policy). Significant other responses almost totally opposed those offered at the state and intermediary levels. Although significant other response patterns differed significantly from university-level response patterns, the gap between the two was less than that found when comparing significant other response patterns with state-level and intermediary-level response patterns.

Possible explanations for the varying response patterns among different levels of state government and significant other are whether the respondents are formal or informal policy makers, their race, and their location in the state government hierarchical structure. All the significant other respondents were black. Also, significant others are informal policy makers in the public policy-making process and need not adhere to a veneer-of-consensus response pattern. The black/minority role in the public policy-making process cannot be understated. Indeed, black respondents at the university level mitigated the veneer-of-

consensus response pattern that was consistent at the state and intermediary government levels. This particular observation has some interesting implications for future research and will be discussed under that section.

In addition to levels of responsibility as a basis for variations in response patterns to a state plan, we observed the following indicators as possible explanations for these variations: 1) proximity to the state plan (respondents who were closer organizationally to a plan tended to have more responsibility for it and more knowledge about it); 2) a policy makers' position in the organizational hierarchy (policy makers at various organizational levels tended to display a distinct veneer of consensus toward their state plan); 3) role of the policy maker, which involves our analyzing the expectations required of a policy maker as a result of his or her role perception or analyzing front-stage/back-stage perceptions (that is, policy makers tended to tell us one thing on the record and another thing off the record); 4) medium of communication, meaning that policy makers' perceptions tended to be influenced by formal/informal means of translating the specifics of the Adams criteria (that is, some were oriented to the plan through seminars and workshops and others were exposed to it haphazardly); 5) race of the policy makers (although most policy makers were white, clear perceptual differences existed between blacks and whites regarding implementing the state's plan); and 6) residential birthplace (migrants versus non-migrants). Home-grown (non-migrant) residents tended to be more defensive and less critical about their state's progress toward implementing its plan than were migrant residents.

These indicators are offered only as possible alternative explanations for variations in response patterns to a state's Adams plan. Although they interrelate and overlap in many ways, they do provide a slightly different analytic angle for understanding variations in response patterns by policy makers. However, the study generated insufficient data to raise these indicators to the level of major variables to be considered in "Implications for Future Research" (with the exception of the policy maker's race). We do suggest that these indicators be considered as possible hypotheses in future case studies.

Observations

A special observation involves the role our research team played in affecting implementation of the Adams criteria by our interactions with the policy makers. There is evidence in social science research that the researcher's own actions can become as much a part of the study design as are the research instruments (Glazer, 1972, P. 68; Manning, 1967). Researchers become factors in the study situation as soon as they enter the field. Ideally, researchers should seek to minimize the effects of their presence (Manning, 1967, Pp. 302-316), but this goal is unrealistic.

In general terms, the Adams criteria have precipitated a climate of conflict. Persons at different levels of the policy process displayed suspicion and distrust of each other. For example, university personnel were often critical of state education officials, especially when the former were black and the latter white. Racial conflict was also noted within universities and state education departments.

Considering the pervasiveness of controversy among actors affected by the Adams criteria, that an all-black research team from a northern

university also would be viewed with suspicion, especially by high-ranking white officials, was not surprising. Suspicion was evidenced by repeated questions concerning our sponsorship. A disproportionately large percentage of interview time was spent explaining that we were not affiliated with OCR, DE, LDF, or the NAACP. Interestingly, a newspaper article referred to one of our principle investigators as a "civil rights researcher" and implied that our research team was aligned with one black and one white politician who are critical of Oklahoma's handling of Adams (Killackey, September 12, 1984). Although our preliminary findings were consistent with these politicians' views, we were not aligned with any group. Our objective was to uncover "patterns" in the policy process. Although we were labeled as friends or foes by various policy makers, our aim was to conduct a critical study in the tradition of Glazer (1972, P. 171): "Social science research demands courage and commitment to a belief that our work is vital in the maintenance of a viable, open society. There can be no sacred topics, no areas too sensitive for critical probing."

Although we actively sought objectivity, our presence during the interviews and the presentations before various committees influenced the policy process itself. Partly in response to our study, a Special Committee on Affirmative Action in Higher Education was created by the Oklahoma Legislature. One member of our research team presented our general findings to this Committee. In addition, we have been in regular contact with the Committee's members.

Our involvement in Oklahoma also helped create a public debate on implementing Adams that was hotly contested in local newspapers. For example, the Killackey article (1984, September 12) claimed that

affirmative action is not taken seriously by educators and politicians, a claim that drew sharp criticism in an editorial titled "Cheap Shots on Integration" (1984, September 13), whose thrust was that Oklahoma is being unfairly criticized. It stressed the "available pool" of blacks.

Our influence in Florida was less demonstrative, possibly because of the more complex and centralized nature of the Florida educational and political structures. The control that top officials exercise over the policy process means that outside pressures have less chance of affecting it.

Implications for Future Research

In general, this study was designed to probe the policy process surrounding the implementation of the Adams criteria in Florida and Oklahoma. More specifically, we sought to discern each state's handling of financial barriers faced by blacks, which we attempted to address through a literature review, primarily because neither Florida nor Oklahoma had compiled total financial aid allocated by type of aid (controlling for race and sex) for the study years, 1978-1982. Both Florida and Oklahoma reported that individual institutions report such data to the state regents for higher education but that OCR did not ask them to compile such data for their annual reports. OCR has asked them, however, to summarize financial aid data or to list financial aid data in an unsystematic fashion that does not lend itself to a trend analysis. Nevertheless, from our observations we offer the following suggestions and hypotheses for future research.

Financial aid dispersed by states and universities should be examined under two categories in order to evaluate the effects of their

efforts to implement state policy in accordance with the Adams criteria. The categories are 1) the amount and type of aid and 2) who benefits from or receives that aid. Evaluating these two variables should produce data that reveal the extent to which original goals and policy statements coincide with or contradict the results. Financial aid dispensed should be separated into targeted and non-targeted aid. Aid targeted specifically for black graduate students should be compiled separately from aid available to all students. Furthermore, aid that is actually received should be broken down into the amount received, the type dispensed (e.g., fellowships and grants), and who the recipients are. These recipients, then, can be classified by race, age and sex in order to adequately address the issue of racial differences in aid distribution.

Collecting this aid information is important because of the link assumed to exist between aid and the eventual recipients of Ph.D. degrees. Grouping these data will distinguish Ph.D. recipients by race, sex, and age. We expect that racial differences in financial aid distribution will affect the number of black students who receive Ph.Ds. Although this figure will vary across universities, collecting these data over time and comparing graduation figures with the aid given will be helpful.

Suggested hypotheses for examination are derived from the initial problem area investigated: "racial differences in distribution of financial aid in graduate and professional schools in the Adams states." They are statements about the behavior that may be encountered around the issue of inequality of monies available and received for graduate education.

Hypothesis 1: If a financial aid program for black students is included in an Adams plan, inequities between black and white graduate aid will disappear. The Adams criteria do not require specific financial aid plans, only a "state plan" to dismantle dual systems of higher education. Enrollment and graduation figures indicate underrepresentation of black students at state universities in the Adams states. At this point, where the problem lies and whether the Adams criteria can actually resolve it are not clear.

Hypothesis 2: Barriers to financial aid for black students are not eliminated by a state plan with a financial-aid stipulation. Evidence indicates that barriers exist in universities that block black students from receiving aid and thus completing their degree programs. However, whether these same barriers exist at the state level is not clear. In addition, considering the social milieu of racism in this society, specifically defining these barriers is difficult. This study was able to isolate particular individuals who sabotaged the flow of funds to particular black students, but this information is not generalizable (at least not at this point), and it is not applicable to the entire population of universities in the Adams states. These barriers need defining in ways that clarify whether or not the Adams criteria can resolve the problem of unequal opportunities in higher education.

Hypothesis 3: Universities with larger fund allocations for financial aid to black students can provide more equitable opportunities. In general, legislators and administrators agree on this issue. In practice, though, the funds do not appear substantially in state budgets and are not easily accessible by black students. Even when monies are allotted to black students, in some cases portions

remain unused, e.g., Florida's McKnight Fellowships in 1983. In fund allocations to minority students, blacks often receive a small percentage of already scarce funds (Pruitt, 1983, P. 7). Testing this hypothesis to determine the effect of state and university awards on black student enrollment, retention and graduation from graduate school will be helpful. Comparing state and university budget efforts with the actual recruitment and funding that black graduate students receive in conjunction with these efforts will be necessary.

Finally, subsequent research on the Adams criteria is necessary because implementing them remains in the embryonic stage. Five years from now, when, presumably, each state will have progressed beyond this stage, the dynamics of the implementation process should be different. Further research will be necessary to gauge inevitable changes in the perceptions and actions of policy makers and in any modifications that may occur in the criteria.

In addition, future research should address the role of informal policy makers and non-administrators in the implementation process. Of course, we interviewed several community and civic leaders and middle-level campus administrators and college professors, but these persons were not central to our study's scope. Since all these groups are affected by Adams implementation, systematically analyzing their attitudes and behaviors toward the guidelines is crucial. After all, college professors are potentially affected more by Adams than are deputy commissioners of education, and the greatest number of blacks in a state university system are likely to be at the university level. In a similar vein, community and civic leaders have historically responded adamantly to desegregation litigation because of how they perceive its

impact on their constituencies. At present, we have little data on the role these groups play in the implementation process; thus, the picture is incomplete.

We strongly recommend that additional research, of a comparative nature, be conducted in recalcitrant states like Louisiana and North Carolina. Data collected from these states, compared with the Florida and Oklahoma data, would be useful in answering the following questions: 1) What factors, both historical and contemporary, influence a state's willingness to implement Adams? 2) Do cooperative and uncooperative states differ significantly in their political, economic, and social arrangements? 3) Has any Adams state made "real" progress toward implementing the criteria? 4) What is the status of Adams nationwide?

This study has sought to precipitate a climate of scholarly research. The Adams criteria and their implementation are fertile ground for empirical inquiry. Adams represents a critical point on the race-relations continuum in America and, as such, it presents the social scientist with an opportunity to gauge the status of such fundamental concepts as equality, justice, and democracy.

APPENDIX I

Tables

TABLE 1

U.S. Graduate Student Enrollment by Race-Ethnicity, 1978 and 1982

	Blacks (Non-Hispanics)	Whites (Non-Hispanics)	All Others*	Total Population
1978-79	61,923 5.7%	891,727 82.8%	123,330 11.5%	1,076,980
1982-83	59,426 5.2%	2,553,503 84.3%	315,247 10.5%	3,028,176

*All others includes American Indian/Alaskan Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, Hispanic and non-resident alien.

Source: Fall Enrollment in Higher Education, 1978 (1979) Washington, DC: National Center for Education Statistics, p. 195. Fall Enrollment in Colleges and Universities, 1982, (1983) Washington, D.C., National Center for Education Statistics, p. 60.

TABLE 2

Florida Graduate Student Enrollment, 1977-1984 (by year and % of total state enrollment)

	Blacks			Whites			Total Graduate Enrollment		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
1983-84	283 1.6%	496 2.9%	779 4.5%	6,759 38.8%	7,564 43.5%	14,323 82.3%	8,569 49.2%	8,838 50.8%	17,407
1982-83	298 1.8%	516 3.0%	814 4.8%	6,640 39.3%	7,286 43.1%	13,926 82.4%	8,366 49.5%	8,534 50.5%	16,900
1981-82	295 1.8%	512 3.1%	807 4.9%	6,774 40.9%	7,028 42.4%	13,802 83.3%	8,408 50.7%	8,165 49.3%	16,573
1980-81	294 1.8%	524 3.2%	818 5.0%	6,756 41.9%	6,768 42.0%	13,533 83.9%	8,270 51.3%	7,863 48.7%	16,133
1979-80	328 2.2%	603 3.0%	931 6.1%	6,531 43.1%	6,160 40.7%	12,691 83.8%	7,898 52.2%	7,243 47.8%	15,141
1978-79	381 2.5%	697 4.6%	1,078 7.1%	6,733 44.0%	6,091 39.8%	12,824 83.8%	8,057 52.7%	7,239 47.3%	15,296
1977-78	436 2.9%	679 4.5%	1,115 7.4%	6,773 45.1%	5,877 39.1%	12,650 84.2%	8,122 54.0%	6,907 46.0%	15,029

Source: Board of Regents, Office of Equal Opportunity Programs, State University System of Florida, Tallahassee.

TABLE 3

Oklahoma Graduate Student Enrollment, 1977-1982 (by year and % of total state enrollment)

	Blacks			Whites			Total Graduate Enrollment		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
1982-83	59 1.4%	70 1.7%	129 3.1%	1,430 34.7%	1,234 29.9%	2,664 64.6%	2,501 60.6%	1,625 39.4%	4,126
1981-82	55 1.4%	78 1.9%	133 3.3%	1,292 31.8%	1,301 32.0%	2,593 63.8%	2,353 57.9%	1,712 42.1%	4,065
1980-81	64 1.5%	85 2.1%	149 3.6%	1,444 34.8%	1,243 30.0%	2,687 64.8%	2,487 60.6%	1,661 40.0%	4,148
1979-80	69 1.7%	63 1.5%	132 3.2%	1,639 39.7%	1,087 26.3%	2,726 66.0%	2,660 64.4%	1,470 35.6%	4,130
1978-79	62 1.5%	73 1.8%	135 3.3%	1,615 39.5%	1,138 27.8%	2,753 67.3%	2,610 63.8%	1,482 36.2%	4,092
1977-78	77 1.7%	83 1.8%	160 3.5%	1,968 43.6%	1,196 26.5%	3,164 70.1%	3,010 66.7%	1,504 33.3%	4,514

Source: State Regents for Higher Education, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

TABLE 4

Total Doctoral Degrees Conferred (U.S.)

	Blacks	Whites	Total
1978-79	1,267	26,128	32,654
	3.8%	79.9%	
1982-83	1,000	22,189	31,190
	3.2%	71.1%	

Sources: Profile of 1982-83 Recipients of Doctorates. (1984, September 12). Chronicle of Higher Education, James E. Blackwell, Mainstreaming Outsiders: The Production of Black Professionals (Bayside, NY: General Hall, 1981).

TABLE 5

Florida Doctoral Degrees Conferred, 1977-1983 (by year and % of state total

	Blacks			Whites			Total State Degrees Conferred
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	
1982-83	10 1.5%	20 3.0%	30 4.5%	305 45.5%	200 29.8%	505 75.3%	671
1981-82	11 1.8%	17 2.7%	28 4.5%	290 47%	180 29.2%	470 76.2%	617
1980-81	20 2.9%	14 2.0%	34 4.9%	335 48.1%	213 30.6%	548 78.7%	697
1979-80	15 2.1%	11 1.6%	26 3.7%	347 49.6%	200 28.6%	547 78.2%	699
1978-79	12 1.7%	14 2.0%	26 3.7%	371 52%	167 23.5%	538 75.5%	713
1977-78	11 1.7%	11 1.7%	22 3.4%	323 49.6%	170 26.1%	493 75.7%	651

Source: Board of Regents, Office of Equal Opportunity Programs, State University System of Florida, Tallahassee.

TABLE 6

Oklahoma Doctoral Degrees Conferred, 1977-1983 (by year and % of state total

	Blacks			Whites			Total State Degrees Conferred
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	
1982-83	6 1.6%	7 1.8%	13 3.4%	160 42.1%	113 29.7%	273 71.8%	380
1981-82	5 1.5%	6 1.8%	11 3.3%	165 49.5%	84 25.2%	249 74.7%	333
1980-81	7 2%	4 1.1%	11 3.1%	170 48.2%	77 21.8%	247 70%	353
1979-80	5 1.4%	2 0.6%	7 2%	181 50.6%	82 22.9%	263 73.5%	358
1978-79	12 3%	10 2.5%	22 5.5%	220 55.7%	80 20.2%	300 75.9%	395
1977-78	7 1.9%	3 0.8%	10 2.7%	205 56.6%	85 23.5%	290 80.1%	362

Source: State Regents for Higher Education, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

TABLE 7

Black Elected Officials by Office

State	Total	Senate and State Legislatures	City and County Offices	Law Enforcement	Education*
Florida	117	12	88	5	13
Oklahoma	86	5	59	2	20

*College boards, school boards and other

Source: Oklahoma Urban League, Oklahoma City Newcomer/Visitor Guide to Oklahoma City: A Black Perspective (Oklahoma City); Hendrix Chandler, Dreams and Political Realities (Tallahassee: Florida State Board of Regents, 1983, p. 9); U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1982-83, (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, P. 488.

TABLE 8

State Voter Registration, 1982

	Voting Age Population	Registered Voters	Persons Voting
Florida			
Blacks	1,098,000 (13.9%)	552,000 (50.3%)	168,000 (30.4%)
Whites	6,707,000 (84.9%)	4,077,000 (60.8%)	1,757,000 (43.1%)
Oklahoma			
Blacks	94,000 (4.2%)	55,000 (59.2%)	25,000 (44.9%)
Whites	2,038,000 (90.9%)	1,290,000 (63.3%)	613,000 (47.5%)

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce News (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 18, 1983, Table 4.)

TABLE 9

National Voter Registration, 1982

	Voting Age Population	Registered Voters	Persons Voting
Blacks	17,624,000 (10.7%)	10,422,000 (59.1%)	7,581,000 (43%)
Whites	143,607,000 (86.8%)	94,205,000 (65.6%)	71,679,000 (49.9%)

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce News, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 18, 1983, Table 2).

TABLE 10

Oklahoma Black Elected Officials and Their Committee Appointments

Senators

E. Melvin Porter

Business and Labor
Human Resources
Executive Nominations
Judiciary

Bernard J. McIntyre

Business and Labor
Finance
Human Resources
Standards and Ethics

Representatives

Kevin Cox

Public Health
Education Common
Human Services

Don Ross

Appropriations and Budget
Industry and Labor Relations
Insurance
Judiciary

Freddye Williams

Criminal Justice
Education Common
House Administration
Human Services
Public Health

Source: Oklahoma Rural News, The Picture and Committee Assignment Guide of the Second Session of 39th Oklahoma Legislature (Oklahoma City, Oklahoma: Oklahoma Association of Electric Cooperatives, 1984).

TABLE 11

Florida's Black Legislators and Their Committee Appointments

Senators

Arnett Girardeau

- Commerce
- Governmental Operations
- Transportation

Carrie Meek

- Administrative Procedures
- Corrections
- Probation and Parole
- Education
- Health and Rehabilitative Services

Representatives

Corrine Brown

- Corrections
- Probation and Parole
- Regulatory Reform
- Retirement
- Personnel and Collective Bargaining
- Transportation

James Burke

- Criminal Justice
- Education, K-12
- Higher Education

Bill Clark

- Veterans Affairs
- Health and Rehabilitative Services
- Regulatory Reform

Douglas Jamerson

- Education, K-12
- Governmental Operations
- Natural Resources
- Veterans Affairs

Alfred Lawson

- Agriculture
- Higher Education
- Judiciary
- Tourism and Economic Development

Willie Logan

- Community Affairs
- Corrections
- Probation and Parole
- Finance and Taxation
- Health and Rehabilitative Services

Table 11 (continued)

James Hargrett

- Appropriations
- Commerce
- Community Affairs
- Tourism and Economic Development

Alzo Reddick

- Education, K-12
- Regulatory Reform
- Tourism and Economic Development

Jefferson Reaves

- Education, K-12
- Regulatory Reform
- Retirement
- Personnel and Collective Bargaining

John Thomas

- Judiciary
- Criminal Justice
- Higher Education
- Tourism and Economic Development

Source: Committee on Higher Education, Florida House of Representatives, Tallahassee, Florida.

TABLE 12

National College-Age Cohort and Total Population, 1980

	College Age (18-24 years)	Total Population
Blacks	3,850,000 (13.4%)	26,488,218 (11.7%)
Whites	24,133,000 (83.7%)	188,340,790 (83.2%)
Total Population	28,823,000	241,110,708

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce News, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 18, 1983); The New Population Mix, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1981, P. E5.

TABLE 13

Percent and Total Population of Florida by Race, 1980

Whites	1,342,478	77.2%
Blacks	8,178,387	13.4%
Hispanics	857,898	9.4%
Total Population	10,597,890	

Source: The New Population Mix, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1981, P. E5.

TABLE 14

College-Age (18-24 Years) Population by Race, Florida and Oklahoma, 1980

	Blacks	Whites	Total State Population
Florida	192,712 (16.9%)	913,831 (80.2%)	1,139,905
Oklahoma	33,952 (8.5%)	334,450 (83.2%)	401,900

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce News, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 18, 1983); The New Population Mix, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1981, P. E5.

TABLE 15

Percent and Total Population of Oklahoma by Race, 1980

Whites	2,597,783	84.3%
Blacks	204,658	6.6%
Native Americans	280,238	9.1%

Source: The New Population Mix, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1981, P. E5.

TABLE 16

National Median Family Income, 1980

Blacks	$13,989
Whites	$24,176
Hispanics	$16,242
All Families	$23,204

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, United States Census of Population: 1981, No. 137, Money Income of Households, Families, and Persons in the United States, Series P-60, p. 2; The State of Black America in 1984, N.Y.: National Urban League, Inc. January 19, 1984, pp. 6 and 172.

TABLE 17

Persons Below the Poverty Level, 1981*

Whites	21,553,000	11.1%
Blacks	9,173,000	34.2%
Hispanics	3,713,000	26.5%
All Persons	31,822,000	14.0%

*The poverty threshold was $9,287 for a family of four.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, United State Census of Population: 1981, No. 138, Characteristics of the Population Below the Poverty Level, Series P-60, p. 2; The State of Black America, N.Y.: National Urban League, Inc., January 19, 1984, pp. 5 and 173.

TABLE 18

Oklahoma and Florida Median Family Incomes in 1979 by Race

	Oklahoma	Florida
Black Median Family Income	$11,683	$10,807
White Median Family Income	$18,376	$18,244

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, United State Census of Population: 1980, General Social and Economic Characteristics, Ch. C, part 38 and 11, PC 80-1-C38 and PC 80-1-C11, July, 1983, p. 70 and p. 114.

TABLE 19

The Education Pipeline for Black and White Students in the U.S., 1980

	Blacks	Whites
Graduate From High School	72%	83%
Enter College	29%	38%
Complete College	12%	23%
Enter Graduate or Professional School	8%	14%
Complete Graduate or Professional School	4%	8%

Source: Text of the Recommendations of the Ford Foundation's Panel, Chronicle of Higher Education, February 3, 1982, p. 3.

TABLE 20

Black Faculty in Oklahoma's Traditionally White Institutions, 1982-1983*

Institution	Total	Black Faculty	Percent Black
Cameron University	240	2	0.83
Carl Albert College	125	1	0.80
Central State University	553	20	3.62
Claremore Junior College	161	3	1.86
Connors State College	72	6	8.33
East Central Oklahoma State University	212	3	1.42
Eastern Oklahoma State University	108	2	1.85
El Reno Junior College	90	1	1.11
Murray State College	124	0	0.00
Northeastern Oklahoma A & M College	151	1	0.66
Northeastern Oklahoma State University	323	9	2.79
Northern Oklahoma College	124	1	0.81
Northwestern Oklahoma State University	103	0	0.00
Oklahoma Coll. of Osteopathic Med. & Sur.	70	8	4.29
Oklahoma State School of Tech. Training	176	4	2.27
Oklahoma State University Main Campus	1,305	34	2.61
Oklahoma State University Tech. Inst.	214	5	2.34
Oscar Rose Junior College	409	22	5.38
Panhandle State University	77	0	0.00
Sayre Junior College	30	0	0.00
Seminole Junior College	55	0	0.00
South Oklahoma City Junior College	450	13	2.89
Southeastern Oklahoma State University	168	3	1.79
Southwestern Oklahoma State University	230	2	0.87
Tulsa Junior College	1,133	28	2.47
University of Oklahoma Health Science CN.	744	18	2.42
University of Oklahoma Main Campus	1,194	18	1.51
University of Science & Arts of Oklahoma	77	1	1.30
Western Oklahoma State College	116	3	2.59
TOTALS	8,834	208	2.34

*Figures for tenured and non-tenured faculty were not available when the table was compiled.

Source: DBS Corporation, Final Analysis for the State of Oklahoma (Arlington, Virginia, November 1983, p. 17-29.

TABLE 21

Black Faculty in Florida's Traditionally White Institutions, 1982-1983

Institution	Tenured Faculty			Non-Tenured Faculty		
	Total	Black	% Black	Total	Black	% Black
Florida Atlantic University	222	2	(0.9)	91	2	(2.1)
Florida International University	210	14	(6.7)	202	16	(7.9)
Florida State University	660	15	(2.3)	375	18	(4.8)
University of Florida	1,406	18	(1.3)	1,159	39	(3.4)
University of Central Florida	184	5	(2.7)	166	7	(4.2)
University of North Florida	94	6	(6.4)	71	9	(12.7)
University of South Florida	643	13	(2.0)	353	19	(5.4)
University of West Florida	146	1	(0.7)	50	5	(10.0)
TOTALS	3,565	74	(2.1)	2,467	134	(5.4)

Source: Board of Regents Office for Equal Opportunity Programs, State University System of Florida, Addendum (Tallahassee, Florida, May 1983), p. IV-13-14.

TABLE 22

Black Administrators in the Oklahoma State University System, 1982-1983

Institution	Total	Black Administrators	Percent Black
Cameron University	48	4	8.33
Carl Albert College	17	1	5.88
Central State University	29	3	10.34
Claremore Junior College	7	0	0.00
Connors State College	11	1	9.09
East Central Oklahoma State University	16	0	0.00
Eastern Oklahoma State University	11	0	0.00
El Reno Junior College	14	1	7.14
Murray State College	4	0	0.00
Northeastern Oklahoma A & M College	30	0	0.00
Northeastern Oklahoma State University	20	1	5.00
Northern Oklahoma College	10	0	0.00
Northwestern Oklahoma State University	6	0	0.00
Oklahoma Coll. of Osteopathic Med. & Sur.	27	1	3.70
Oklahoma State School of Tech. Training	8	0	0.00
Oklahoma State University Main Campus	244	1	0.41
Oklahoma State University Tech. Inst.	9	0	0.00
Oscar Rose Junior College	38	3	7.89
Panhandle State University	8	0	0.00
Sayre Junior College	2	0	0.00
Seminole Junior College	10	0	0.00
South Oklahoma City Junior College	31	2	6.45
Southeastern Oklahoma State University	19	0	0.00
Southwestern Oklahoma State University	26	0	0.00
Tulsa Junior College	40	3	0.00
University of Oklahoma Health Science CN.	168	13	7.74
University of Oklahoma Main Campus	476	15	3.15
University of Science & Arts of Oklahoma	12	0	0.00
Western Oklahoma State College	11	0	0.00
TOTALS	1,352	49	3.62

Source: DBS Corporation, Final Analysis for the State of Oklahoma (Arlington, Virginia, November 1983, p. 17-29.

TABLE 23

Black Administrators in the Florida State University System
1982-1983

Institution	Total	Black Administrators	% Black
Florida Atlantic University	100	6	6.0
Florida International University	151	21	13.9
Florida State University	259	20	7.7
University of Florida	431	11	2.6
University of Central Florida	143	9	6.3
University of North Florida	84	11	13.1
University of South Florida	233	9	3.9
University of West Florida	91	4	4.4
TOTALS	1,492	91	6.1

Source: Board of Regents Office for Equal Opportunity Programs, State University System of Florida, Addendum (Tallahassee, Florida, May 1983), p. IV-12.

TABLE 24

Participants' Level of Knowledge of, and Type of Response to, State Plan, by Level of Responsibility

	Level of Knowledge		Type of Response			
Level of Responsibility	highly aware	little or no knowledge of specifics	"good faith" efforts	past accomplishments	rationalize exclusion of minorities	legal relationship of state to Adams criteria
State Level (Governer's office State Legislature)	many	few	many	many	many	many
Intermediary Level (Board of Regents, Boards of Trustees)	few	many	many	many	many	many
University Level	few	some	some	some	some	some
Influential Others Level	few	some	none	none	none	none

Key:

Number of Participants

None: 0
Few: 1-2
Some: 3-5
Many: 5-9

APPENDIX II

Interview Schedule Document

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

State _____ Date _____

Interviewer(s) _____

_____

A. INTERVIEWEE BACKGROUND

1. Name: _____

2. Address: _____

_____

_____

3. Telephone Number: ( ) _____

4. Position: _____

5. Affiliated with which of the following:

   a. Governor's Office _____

   b. State Legislature _____

   c. Board of Regents _____

   d. Board of Trustees _____

   e. University President's Office _____

   f. Institutional Administrative, Academic, and/or affirmative action Personnel _____

   g. Interested others, specify _____

6. Responsibilities _____

_____

_____

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Begin Interview- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

B. KNOWLEDGE OF FINANCIAL AID POLICY FOR STATE

1. How familiar are you with the legal or other basis for the Adams State Financial Aid Policy that is intended to facilitate black participation in and completion of doctoral degree programs?

_____

_____

2. How familiar are you with the nature and scope of the Adams States financial aid plan for black doctoral degree students? _____

IF THE INTERVIEWEE DOES NOT DISCUSS SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THAT STATE'S PLAN

Probe: What specific plans has _____(state)developed to increase black enrollment in and completion of doctoral degree programs?

Probe: How are these proposals different from the plans submitted by other states? _____

3. Who are the persons (official titles) involved in the formulation and implementation of the Adams financial aid plan in your state?

Name	Title
a.	
b.	
c.	
d.	

IF THE INTERVIEWEE DOES NOT DISCUSS THE SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES AND PERFORMANCE OF THESE PERSONS

Probe: What are their specific responsibilities?

a. _____

b. _____

c. _____

d. _____

Probe: Have you discussed the state's financial aid plan with them?

Probe: What steps has (one of the names) _____ taken toward implementing the plan?

Probe: What steps has (one of the names) _____ taken toward implementing the plan?

4. How would you describe the nature of the interaction (cooperative, non-cooperative) between the persons and units of government (intra-state and interstate agencies) involved in the formulation and implementation of the Adams State Financial Aid Plan?

IF THE INTERVIEWEE DOES NOT GIVE SPECIFIC AND DESCRIPTIVE DATA	

Probe: Is the nature of the interaction different from what occurs on other state policy matters?

Probe: No. 4 Cont.

5. How do state procedures affect the implementation of this financial aid plan?

IF THE INTERVIEWEE IS NOT SPECIFIC

Probe: Are (state name) _____'s procedures flexible enough to accommodate a plan as significant as this?

Probe: Do these procedures need to changed?

6. Now I would like to ask you several broad questions regarding the Adams Decree. What are your general feelings about the Adams Decree?

IF THE RESPONDENT IS NOT SPECIFIC

Probe: Is it necessary in (state)_____ 130 ?

_____

_____

_____

Probe: Is it feasible in (state) _____?

_____

_____

Probe: What are the implications of the Adams Decree for (state) _____?

_____

_____

_____

_____

7. Do you have any additional feelings on (state) _____'s financial aid plan or the Adams Degree in general?

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

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